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JURISDICTION
This Court h a s jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (2006).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court correctly
determined that where the use of the privately owned streambed of the
Weber River is more than incidental to the right of floating thereon, such
use would constitute a trespass.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the trial court's
conclusions of law are reviewed for "correctness." Laney v. Fairview City,
2002 UT 79, 1 9, 57 P.3d 1007, 1011.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal involves an issue of first impression in Utah. Jodi
Conatser, Kevin Conatser, Lacey Conatser and Nicole Mann (collectively
the "Conatsers") sought a declaration from the trial court that the public
h a s an easement to use the privately owned streambed and banks of the
Weber River (the "River"), and not just a right of floatation upon the
public waters constituting the River. On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the trial court correctly concluded that the right of floating on

1

natural waters is recognized in Utah, but that such a right does not allow
members of the public to walk on the privately owned riverbed or
riverbanks, except to the extent that such contact is incidental to the
right of floating.
In J.J.N.P. Co. v. State Div. of Wildlife Resources, 655 P.2d 1133,
1138, n.6 (Utah 1982), this Court adopted the majority view that because
the public owns the water in natural streams, there is a corresponding
right to float upon such waters. In doing so, the Court embraced the
rationale and policy expressed by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Day v.
Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961), which held that the right of
floating does not include a broader easement to walk on privately owned,
subaqueous land for fishing, hunting or other purposes. Because that
issue was not before the Court J.J.N.P., however, it declined to reach the
question. This case squarely presents the issue the Court appropriately
declined to decide in J.J.N.P. and, despite the trial court's attempt to
limit the applicability of its holding to the named parties, has potentially
far-reaching implications for private property owners throughout the
state of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about J u n e 4, 2000, the Conatsers put a small rubber raft in
the Weber River at a public access point and proceeded to float down the

River to another public access point. [R. 00314.] Between the public
access points, the River crosses over a number of parcels of private real
property. [Id.]
While floating the River, the Conatsers touched the privately owned
streambed in the following ways: (i) the raft in which they were riding
touched or skidded along the bottom of the River in shallow areas, (ii) the
paddles or oars touched the bottom on occasion, (iii) Kevin Conatser's
fishing tackle came in contact with the bottom, and (iv) Kevin Conatser
intentionally got out of the raft and walked along the streambed to
facilitate his fishing and to manipulate fencing that had been strung over
the River. [R. 00314.]
On two occasions prior to J u n e 4, 2000, Kevin Conatser was
informed by one or more of the Defendants that he was trespassing on
private property. [Id.) On J u n e 4, 2000, the Conatsers were again
informed by two of the Defendants that they were trespassing and were
asked to pick u p their raft and walk out via a parallel railroad easement.
[Id.] The Conatsers refused to walk out as requested and instead
continued downstream to a public access point where a Deputy Sheriff
from Morgan County was waiting. [R. 00315.] The Sheriff cited Kevin
and Jodi Conatser for criminal trespass for which they were later found
guilty by the Morgan County Justice Court. [Id.] On appeal of the
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manner urged by the Conatsers.
The trial court thus correctly concluded tha t the right of floating on
natural waters is recognized in Utah, but that such righ t does not allow

members of the public to walk on the privately owned riverbed or
riverbanks, except to the extent that such contact is incidental to the
right of floating. The trial court's ruling is in harmony with prior Utah
Supreme decisions, the influential and oft-cited Wyoming case of Day v.
Armstrong which carefully balanced the correlative rights of landowners
and recreationists to privately owned subaqueous land, and Utah
statutes relating to the issue. The trial court should, therefore, be
affirmed.
ARGUMENT
A.

BECAUSE IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE RIVER IS NONNAVIGABLE, THE CONATSERS CANNOT ESTABLISH A RIGHT TO
BE UPON THE PRIVATELY OWNED RIVERBED.
The Conatsers have conceded that the River is non-navigable and

that, as a result, its bed is in private ownership. Because the bed in
question is in private ownership, the owners thereof have the
constitutionally protected right to prohibit others from making use of it.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that the right of the
public to float on natural waters is recognized in Utah, but that such a
right does not allow members of the public to walk on the privately
owned riverbed or riverbanks, except to the extent that such contact is
incidental to the right of floating.
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1

Prior Utah Supreme Court decisions support the trial court's
ruling that the public's right to make use of the River' s bed
is limited to contact that is incidental to the right to float
upon the water.

This Court has previously recognized the importance of the
respective rights held by both tl: ic public and the private property owners
-

,.

•

"' i'
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As a corollary of the proposition that the public owns the
water is the rule that there is a public easement over the
water regardless of who owns the water beds beneath the
water., Therefore, public waters do no 1: trespass in areas
where they are naturally appear', and the public does not
trespass when upon such waters.
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here, its careful use of words comports with an earlier Utah case decided
more than a half-century ago involving a landowner's right to exclude

others from land underlying another non-navigable body of water, Scipio
Lake.
As noted by the Court in Monroe v State, 175 P.2d 759 (Utah 1946),
the parties' respective rights hinged entirely on whether Scipio Lake was
navigable. On the one hand, if the lake was navigable, the subaqueous
land belonged to the State, and the defendant, who was seeking to use
the land underlying the lake for grazing under a lease from the State,
would be entitled to make use of the land. Id. at 760. If, on the other
hand, the lake was non-navigable, the plaintiff, as a private landowner,
would be allowed to exclude the defendant from making use of the
lakebed. Id. After analyzing the facts before it, the Court determined
that the lake was indeed non-navigable and title to the lakebed,
therefore, was held by the plaintiff. Id. at 762. Because the plaintiff
owned the bed of the lake, he had the right to exclude others, including
the defendant, from making use of it. Id.
From Monroe, two concepts that are determinative of this matter
are derived. First, whether a body of water is non-navigable, although
irrelevant for determining whether the public h a s a right to be upon or
over the water, 1 is an indispensable factor in determining the extent of

1

SeeJ.J.N.R, 655 P.2d 1137 ("Irrespective of the ownership of the
bed and navigability of the water, the public, if it can obtain lawful
7

the public's interest in the underlying bed. Quite simply, if the body of
water in question is non-navigable, the land underlying it is in private
ownership. The Conatsers have conceded that the River is nonnavigable. [R.00536, Hearing Transcript, at pgs. 10, 39-40.] Necessarily,
then, the portions of streambed at issue aire in private ownership.
Second, private ownership of subaqueous beds of non-navigable bodies
of water includes with it the important right to exclude others from those
beds - a right that h a s been repeatedly found to be "one of the most
essential sticks in bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
Consequently, the Conatsers cannot establish a right to be upon the bed
of the River.
2.

The Day v. Armstrong decision, which h a s been embraced by
this Court, provides a well-reasoned and balanced approach
to the issues at hand.

In J. J.N.P., this Court based its decision that the public h a s the
right to float on the naturally flowing waters on the well-reasoned
decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court in Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d
137 (Wyo. 1961). SeeJ.J.N.P. 655 P.2d 1136-37. The Day decision
carefully balanced the competing interests of the public to be upon

access to the body of water, has the right to . . . participate in any lawful
activity when utilizing that water.")

publicly owned water and the right of the private landowner to exclude
others from the privately owned land underlying such waters.
Much like the instant case, the conflict in Day arose after a private
rancher on the North Platte River attempted to prevent the passage of
recreational floaters, including one Day, a recreationist. Id. at 141. The
central dispute in Day centered on the rights of the public to make use of
an non-navigable stream and, importantly, its privately owned bed. Id.
at 139.
As with Utah, Wyoming law provides that all water is owned by the
state and that land underlying navigable waters is also owned by the
state, whereas land underlying non-navigable waters can be and often is
privately owned. Id. at 146; cf. Nephilrr. Co. v. Bailey, 181 P.2d 215, 216
(Utah 1947); Monroe, 175 P.2d at 760. To reach the issue of the public's
right to make use of the river's bed, the Day court had to first determine
whether the bed's title was in private or public ownership. A navigability
determination was t h u s necessary. See Day, 632 P.2d at 144 (noting
that though the "test of navigability does not determine other uses to
which the State may put its waters . . . [it] would determine title to the
land underlying them.")

On this point, the Wyoming court stated:

Streams in their natural state, such as that described by the
factual matter appearing in the record before us, although
capable of intermittent floating of craft for recreational use
and for small commercial use in the floating of ties, logs, and
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timber, are nevertheless unsuited for navigation in interstate
or international commerce and are not of such economic
value for transportation as justifies their being classified as
navigable waters, thereby taking from riparian proprietors the
title and ownership of the bed and channel of the river where
it flows by, through, over, across, or upon their lands. So we
m u s t hold the portion of the river here in question is
nonnavigable and that its bed and channel are the property of
the riparian owner.
Id. at 147.
Although it concluded that the river was non-navigable and the
beds therefore in private ownership, the Day court held that
"irrespective" of navigability, the public was entitled to make use of the
water for floating provided the water was actually capable of supporting
such use. Id. at 146 ("When waters are able to float craft, they may be so
used.*); accord J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137.

It cautioned, however, that

"in using the State's waters for floating, the public is not privileged,
except as incidental to such use, to violate the rights of riparian owners."
Id. at 146. Moreover,
where the use of the bed or channel is more than incidental
to the right of floating use of the waters, and the primary use
of the bed or channel rather than floating use of the waters,
such wading or walking is a trespass upon the lands
belonging to the riparian owners and is unlawful. Such
trespass cannot be made lawful either by legislative or judicial
action.
Id.
While it is true that the State's power to regulate the use of water
does not depend on a designation of navigable or non-navigable, it does

not follow that the State can grant unlicensed use of the private land
underlying or surrounding the non-navigable water, which, unlike the
water, it neither owns nor holds in trust for the public. 2 Under such
circumstances, the public should only be allowed use of the water for
activities that are lawful, including the floating of craft when the water in
question is so capable of being used. See Day, 362 P.2d at 147. But this
does not, despite the Conatsers' urging, bestow upon the public the
privilege of violating the rights of private land owners by authorizing
activities such as walking and wading that are appropriately considered
unlawful. Id. at 146. Such a contention was rejected in Day as an
unjustified intrusion on private property rights, and should also be
rejected here.

2

Extending the public's easement over the water to also include the
right to make unfettered use of the privately owned subaqueous property
results in a taking. 'To say that an appropriation of a public easement
across a landowner's premises does not constitute a taking of property
b u t rather a mere restriction on use, is to use the words in a manner
that deprives them of all their ordinary meaning." Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 830 (1987) (holding that if California
wanted a public easement across private property, it could use its power
of eminent domain, but it would constitute a taking that must be paid
for) (internal citation omitted); see also Kaiser Aetna, AAA U.S. at 179-80
(concluding that if the government wanted to open a privately owned
marina to the public it could do so, but the "right to exclude," so
universally held to be a fundamental property right, is a type of interest
that the Government cannot take without paying just compensation).

11

3.

At a fundamental level, the question of navigability is
inescapable.

Regardless of navigability, all waters in Utah, unless they have
been lawfully appropriated, are held in trust by the state for the benefit
of its citizens. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (2006); see also Adams v.
Portage Irr. Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 652-54 (Utah 1937).
However, only if a body of water is navigable will its bed also be held in
trust by the state and considered "public lands of the state." See State v.
Rolio, 262 P. 987, 993-94 (Utah 1927) ("It is settled law in this countiy
that lands underlying navigable waters within a state belong to the state
in its sovereign capacity."') (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S. 49, 54 (1926)). Because private entities are generally without
authority to exclude others from public lands, see, e.g., United States v.
Buford, 30 P. 433, 434 (Utah 1892) (finding that the private entity had
"no right to exclude the public from the public lands at all, in any way
whatever"), there can be little question that members of the public have a
right to make use of the publicly owned land underlying navigable bodies
of water.
By comparison, when, as in this case, a body of water is nonnavigable, a private landowner may hold title to the underlying bed and
is to be accorded rights consistent with the traditional notions of private
property ownership, including the hallmark of all such private property

rights - the right to exclude others. See B.AM. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake
County, 2004 UT App 34, Tf 57, 87 P.3d 710, 729 (noting that the right to
exclude others is one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
commonly characterized as property) (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 830); see
also Monroe, 175 P.2d 759.
The fact that the bed of a non-navigable body of water belongs to
the riparian owner in no way alters the statutory edict that the water
belongs to the public, nor does it "defeat the State's power to regulate the
use of the water or defeat the right the public h a s to be on the water."
J.J.N.P., 6 5 5 P.2d at 1137. However, neither the State's power to
regulate nor the public's right to be upon the water defeats the rights,
including the right to exclude others, that appropriately belong to the
owners of the land underlying those waters. Accordingly, if private
property rights are to be respected and preserved, a navigability
determination cannot merely be overlooked, but is instead inescapable.
B.

UTAH STATUTORILY RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANT
PROERTY RIGHTS BELONGING TO OWNERS OF STREAMBEDS.
Utah statutorily protects the important property rights belonging to

owners of streambeds. Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14, which deals with
entry on private land by hunters and fishermen, requires that for private
property to be properly posted "'No Trespassing' signs or a minimum of
100 square inches of bright yellow, bright orange or fluorescent paint are
13

displayed at all corners, fishing streams crossing property lines, roads,
gates and rights-of-way entering the l a n d / Utah Code Ann. § 23-2014(1 )(d) (2005) (emphasis supplied). A person engaged in taking wildlife
or wildlife related activities may not "without the permission of the owner
or person in charge, enter upon privately owned land that is cultivated or
properly posted." Id. at § 23-20-14(2)(a). A violation of subsection 2(a) is
considered a class B misdemeanor. Id. at § 23-20-14(6).
By allowing "fishing streams" to be properly posted, the legislature
h a s expressly recognized the private landowner's right to exclude others
from privately owned streambeds in this state. If, as the Conatsers
assert, a public easement exists to wade and walk in all streams in the
state, the legislature's inclusion of "fishing streams" in the statute would
be rendered meaningless. See Trail Mtn. Coal Company v. The Utah Div.
of State Lands and Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Utah 1996) (refusing
to construe a statute so as to render terms meaningless).
The rule that is most consonant with the decisions of this Court in
J.J.N.P., Monroe and the Utah statutes pertaining to the issue is that set
forth in Day v. Armstrong and adopted by the trial court. In other words,
where use of a privately owned streambed is more than incidental to the
right of floating thereon, such use constitutes a trespass. [R. 00319.] In
addition to providing a practical, workable solution to the issue at hand,

such a rule promotes harmony between the constitutionally protected
private property rights belonging to the Defendants and all other
landowners in the state of Utah with the interests of the public to be
upon the waters of this State.
C.

WYOMING'S RULE, WHICH REPRESENTS THE BETTERREASONED APPROACH WHEN COMPARED TO THE
APPROACHES TAKEN BY OTHER WESTERN STATES, INCLUDING
COLORADO AND WYOMING, SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN UTAH.
Western States have taken a variety of approaches in resolving

conflicts over water use between the public and private landowners. At
the extremes are Montana and Colorado, reflecting the most "liberal* and
"restrictive" positions, respectively. Compare Stephen D. Osborne, et a/.,
Laws Governing Recreational Access to Waters of the Columbia Basin: A
Survey and Analysis, 33

ENVT'L.

L. 399, 445 (2003) (asserting that

Montana's access laws are the most liberal among the Northwestern
states of Idaho, Washington, and Oregon), and Lori Potter et al., Legal
Underpinnings of the Right to Float Through Private Property in Colorado: A
Reply to John Hill, 5 U. DENV.

WATER

L. REV. 457, 498 (2002) (suggesting

that Colorado's access laws are the most restrictive among the states of
Wyoming, New Mexico, Utah, Montana, Idaho, and California). A review
of the seminal cases from Montana and Colorado relating to the issue at
bar further supports the conclusion that the "middle of the road" rule
adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Day v. Armstrong is the

15

better-reasoned and more appropriate approach to resolving the instant
dispute.
1.

Colorado's approach is currently unworkable in Utah.

The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025
(Colo. 1979), narrowly defined the public's right to use streams flowing
through private land without the owner's consent. Emmert and the other
defendants had floated and fished from rafts over private property on the
Colorado River and had touched the riverbed as they crossed the
property. Id. at 1026. At the landowner's request, the sheriff arrested
Emmert and the other defendants. The defendants were convicted of
violating a trespass statute that provided: "[a] person commits the crime
of third degree criminal trespass if he unlawfully enters or remains in or
upon premises." See id. at 1026. Emmert appealed his conviction to the
Colorado Supreme Court.
On appeal, the court noted the general rule of property law in
Colorado states "that the land underlying non-navigable streams is the
subject of private ownership and is vested in the proprietors of the
adjoining lands." Id. at 1027 (citing More v. Johnson, 568 P.2d 437, 439
(Colo. 1977); Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 687 (Colo. 1905); Hanlon v.
Hobson, 51 P. 433, 435 (Colo. 1897)). The parties had stipulated that the
Colorado River was non-navigable, and no challenge was made to the

adjacent landowner's ownership of the riverbed. Emmert, 597 P.2d at
1026-27.
Applying the common law rule "cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad
coelum" which means that "he who owns the surface of the ground h a s
the exclusive right to everything which is above it," the court held that
"the ownership of the bed of a non-navigable stream vests in the owner
the exclusive right of control of everything above the stream bed, subject
only to constitutional and statutory limitations, restrictions and
regulations." Id. at 1027. Accordingly, one who intruded upon that
space without the permission of the owner, regardless of the recreational
purpose, committed a trespass. Id.
Emmert raised the defense that Article XVI, section 5 of the
Colorado Constitution 3 established a public right to recreational use of
all waters in the state. Id. at 1027-28. Relying on an earlier case,
Hartman v. Tresise, supra, the Colorado Supreme Court disagreed,
concluding that the constitutional provision applied to appropriation of
water for beneficial use. Id. at 1028. In other words, Article XVI, section

3

This section provides: "the water of every natural stream, not
heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared
to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of
the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided."
Colo. Const, art. XVI, § 5.
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5 applied only to the right to make appropriations and not to the use of
the state's water for recreation or fishing.
In 1977, after the defendants' convictions in Emmert and while
their appeal was pending, the Colorado General Assembly passed Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 18-4-504.5, id. at 1029, which defined "premises* for
purposes of criminal trespass as "real property, buildings, and other
improvements thereon, and the stream banks and beds of any nonnavigable fresh water streams flowing through such real property." Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 18-4-504.5 (Lexis 2006). Section 18-4-504.5 thus imposes
criminal trespass liability on anyone who touches the stream banks or
beds of rivers running through private property. Id. at § 18-4-504.5
Although spawning a fair amount of criticism, throughout the past
two decades the Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged
the continued validity of Emmert. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs of
County of Park v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, 45 P.3d 693, 710
(Colo. 2002) (citing Emmert); Bijou Irr. Dist. v. Empire Club, 804 P.2d 175,
185 (Colo. 1991) (citing Emmert). That Colorado's approach to the issue
is not currently in accord with Utah law is borne out by the J. J.N.P.
decision, but it nevertheless remains the law in Colorado.

2.

Montana's attempt to deal with the public's rights to stream
beds h a s resulted in considerable uncertainty.

In contrast to Colorado, the Montana cases cited by the Appellants
demonstrate, to a degree, a slightly more liberal resolution of the conflict,
although the current state of the public's right to make use of privately
owned subaqueous land in Montana is less-than clear.
The first of the four cases cited by the Conatsers, Montana Coalition
for Stream Access v. Outran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984) {"Curran"), dealt
with whether the public had the right to use the streambed of the
Dearborn River, a river the court found to be navigable. Id. at 166. As a
result of being designated navigable, ownership of both the water its bed
was held by the State of Montana and not by the individual landowners
who were attempting to restrict the public's use of the rivers. Id. In light
of the fact that the navigability determination should have been
dispositive of the case, the Montana Supreme Court's sweeping and
unnecessary declaration that "under the Public Trust Doctrine and the
1972 Montana Constitution, any waters that are capable of recreational
use may so be used by the public without regard to streambed ownership
or navigability for non-recreational purposes," id. at 171, is seemingly
perplexing. See Gait v. State, 731 P.2d 912, 922 (1987) (describing the
perplexing nature of the majority decision in Curran) (Sheehy J.,
dissenting).
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If the facts presented in Curran were at issue here, there would be
no question under Utah law as to the proper outcome. Like Montana, in
Utah both the navigable body of water and land underlying it are owned
by the State. A private party, therefore, could not lawfully prohibit the
public's use of either the water or the bed.
Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088
(Mont. 1984) ^HildretYf), decided a little more than a month after Curran
by a divided Montana Supreme Court, involved a similar conflict to
Curran, this time on the Beaverhead River. Id. at 1091. Relying heavily
on the questionable reasoning and language of the Curran decsion, the
court in Hildreth went out of its way to avoid the navigability issue
altogether, ruling instead that it was immaterial. See id. at 1092 The
Hildreth court concluded that regardless of navigability the public had a
"right to access for fishing and navigational purposes to the point of the
high water mark" and a "right to portage in the least intrusive manner
possible, avoiding damage to the adjacent owner's property and his
rights." Id. at 1091.
On the heels of the Curran and Hildreth decisions, Montana's
legislative leaders met to develop what became known as Montana's
Stream Access Law ("SAL"), codified at Montana Code Annotated §§ 23-2301, et seq.y in an attempt to define terms left unclear by Curran and

Hildreth and to allay the fears of landowners over the scope of those
rulings. See Brian Morris, When Rivers Run Dry Under a Big Sky:
Balancing Agricultural and Recreational Claims to Scarce Water Resources
in Montana and the American West, 11 STAN. ENVL L. J. 259, 273 (1992).
The final SAL legislation was signed into law in 1985. Due to the great
pains taken by the legislature to comply with earlier court decisions, the
bill was expected to survive inevitable court challenges. Id. To the
surprise of many, however, the Montana Supreme Court narrowed the
holdings of Curran and Hildreth in case brought to challenge the SAL
shortly after its enactment. Id.
Gait v. Montana involved a constitutional challenge to the SAL and
its provisions regarding the types of permissible uses on streambeds and
banks. See 731 P. 2d 912. Although a divided Montana Supreme Court
found several of the provisions of the SAL to be unconstitutional,
including provisions of the statute that conferred public rights to
overnight camping, construction of duck blinds, big game hunting, and
requirements of private owners to compensate for the cost of portage
routes, it concluded ultimately that the balance of the statutory scheme
accorded with the Montana Constitution. Id. at 916. Even then, the Gait
court reduced the public's ownership and use of surface water to an
easement and although it conceded that the "public has a right of use u p
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to the high water mark* it restricted that right to "only such use as is
necessary to utilization of the water itself." Id. at 915. It further evinced
concern for private landowners when it "reaffirmed] well-established
constitutional principles protecting property interests from confiscation,"
by ruling that the public's rights to the waterways "must be narrowly
confined so that impact to beds and banks owned by private individuals
is minimal." Id. at 916. As noted in a concurring opinion by Justice
Gulbranson,
[W]here the State h a s title to the streambed, it may legislate,
within the limits of declared public policy, the use of the
streambed. Where title to the streambed is privately owned,
the State h a s no legal authority to legislate use of the bed and
banks of that stream without paying j u s t compensation
through lawful eminent domain proceedings.
Id. a t 917. In light of the Gait decision, to say that Montana law allows
for t h e type of unlicensed use of privately owned streambeds sought
herein by the Conatsers is simply inscrutable.
While not explicitly reversing Curran and Hildrethy the Gait decision
can be seen as a significant departure from those decisions by clearly
favoring property owners with a decision that substantially protected
private interests. 4 In light of the about-face of the Montana Supreme

4

Notably, the majorities in both Curran and Gait relied on the Day
v. Armstrong decision for support. Gait's limitation on incidental use to
"such use as is necessary to a utilization of the water itself," 731 P.2d at
915, is similar in effect to the language in Day declaring, "when so

Court in Gait, "one can only conclude that the law respecting the
correlative rights of landowners and the recreational water users in
Montana is adrift in a sea of confusion." Gait, 731 P.2d at 920 (Sheehy
J., dissenting).
The most recent case involving Montana's SAL, Madison v. Graham,
126 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (D. Mont. 2001), involved a constitutional
challenge to Montana's SAL on both due process and void for vagueness
grounds. Id. at 1324. The district court dismissed both claims, holding
that due process claim was barred by res judicata and that the void for
vagueness claim was without merit. Id. at 1327-28. The district court
also dismissed what it construed as a takings claim, 5 but not before
floating craft, as a necessary incident to that use, the bed or channel of
the waters may be unavoidably scraped or touched by the grounding of
craft." Day, 362 P.2d at 145-46. In addition, like Day, the Gait court
recognized that the State was unable to legislate use of the privately
owned property, unless, of course, compensation was made to the
landowners for such use.
5

Madison subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of
the complaint. See Madison v. Graham, 316 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir.
2002). The appellants had alleged in their complaint that enforcement of
the Montana SAL violated their substantive due process rights by
infringing upon their liberty interests and fundamental rights, and they
strenuously protested the construction of their complaint as a takings
claim. Id. at 870. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit found that the
actual h a r m alleged by the plaintiffs was their inability, due to the
statute, to exclude others from their property. Because the right of
landowners to exclude others is an essential private property right, the
Court found that the alleged harms were addressed by the Takings
Clause and that plaintiffs' claim was appropriately regarded as a takings
claim. Id. at 870-71. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
because they sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, not damages
or compensation, their complaint could not be interpreted as a takings
23

suggesting that "the touching of a streambed by a wader is de minimis
and causes no more interference with private property rights than does a
floater." Id. at 1324.
Although heavily relied on by Conatsers here, the Montana trial
court's suggestion that walking on private property causes no more
interference than not walking on the same property is simply illogical.
As clearly borne out by Day, one activity constitutes an unlawful
trespass while the other does not. Day, 362 P.2d at 146 ("[S]uch wading
or walking is a trespass upon the lands belonging to the riparian owners
and is unlawful. Such trespass cannot be made lawful either by
legislative or judicial action.").
Moreover, to suggest that intentionally walking along the bed of a
river comports with the Montana Supreme Court's declaration that the
public's utilization of the streambeds must be "narrowly confined so that
impact to beds and banks owned by private individuals is minimal," is to
eviscerate the meaning of the word "minimal." See Gait, 731 P.2d at 916.
Minimal is generally defined as the "smallest or least possible." See
Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1145 (2d Ed. 1983).

claim, stating that landowners are allowed to seek such equitable relief
in order to resist takings that threaten to violate the Constitution. Id.
The court affirmed dismissal of the complaint but did not consider the
merits of a takings claim, presumably because the plaintiffs did not plead
and specifically denied making such a claim.

O/l

Walking and wading on privately owned streambeds is not the "least
possible* use of those streambeds. Rather, the least possible and only
acceptable use of the privately owned streambeds, as held by the trial
court in this action, the Day decision, and the most recent decision out
of the Montana Supreme Court, is that contact which is merely
incidental to floating upon the waters situated above those beds.
Anything more is not minimal or incidental but instead a trespass.
Although the four Montana cases are interesting, it m u s t be noted
that the earlier two were superseded when Montana's legislature enacted
the SAL, and the more recent two involved challenges to the SAL.
Importantly, other than Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14, the Utah legislature
has made no declaration regarding the public's right to make use of beds
underlying non-navigable bodies of water. In addition, the scope of
Montana" SAL, which governs the rights of the public to be upon water in
Montana, h a s been called into considerable question by the most recent
decision out of Montana' highest court, leaving Montana law, at least as
it applies the correlative rights of landowners and recreationists, "adrift
in a sea of confusion." Gait, 731 P.2d at 920 (J. Sheehy, dissenting).
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D.

USE OF THE STREAMBED IN THE MANNER ADVOCTED BY THE
CONATSERS IS CLEARLY MORE THAN INCIDENTAL TO THE
RIGHT TO BE UPON THE WATER AND ALLOWING SUCH WOULD
RESULT IN AN OUTCOME THAT IS FOR ALL PRACTICAL
PURPOSES UNMANAGEMABLE.
The Conatsers contend that the public's easement to be upon the

River necessarily includes the right to walk on its bed under the guise
that "the owner of the easement is said to have all of the rights incident
or necessary to its proper enjoyment." [Appellants' Brief at p. 18.]
Though the concept of incidental rights is applicable to the case at hand,
it cannot be employed so as to enlarge the public's easement to burden
the servient subaqueous estate in the manner sought. See Nielson v.
Sandberg, 141 P.2d 696, 701 (Utah 1943) ("The right cannot be enlarged
to place a greater burden or servitude on the property."); see also 25 Am.
J u r . 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 81 (2006) (An
easement holder "has the privilege to do such acts as are necessary to
make effective his or her enjoyment of the easement, unless the burden
on the servient tenement is thereby increased."). Moreover, the concept
of incidental rights is already accounted for in the trial court's holding
which expressly allows for contact with the streambeds, provided such
contact is incidental to the public's right of floatation on the River.
Anything more than incidental contact, therefore, exceeds the scope of
the easement to be upon the water and is considered a trespass. This is

in accordance with the Conatsers' own authorities. See, e.g., U.P.C. v.
R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, If 4 1 , n.5, 990 P.2d 945 ("The owner
of an easement is said to have all rights incident or necessary to its
proper enjoyment, but nothing more. . . . If the easement owner exceeds
his rights . . . he becomes a trespasser . . . .w) (quoting 25 Am. J u r . 2d
Easements § 81 (1996)).
As justification for imposing the additional burden of allowing the
public to trespass on the privately owned streambed, the Conatsers
contend that streambeds in question are already burdened by a variety of
existing federal and state laws. [Appellants' Brief at p. 23.] Virtually all
privately owned land is to some extent burdened by laws proscribing or
prohibiting what can and cannot be done thereon. See, e.g., Am. Bush v.
City ofS. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, 140 P.3d 1235 (recognizing that cities
have the power to regulate the types of activities that can be undertaken
at certain locations); Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., 2005 UT 82, 128 P.3d
1151 (recognizing that land ownership does not allow one to disregard
county zoning ordinances); Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, 108
P.3d 701 (upholding a zoning ordinance relating to the leasing of owneroccupied property). But the fact that certain real property is already
burdened by legal restrictions in one form or another, whether
subaqueous or not, cannot serve as a justification for imposing
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additional burdens on the property. This is particularly the case when
the burden being imposed will necessarily result in a confiscation of the
most valuable right in the bundle or rights referred to as property - the
right to exclude others. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176.
Under the Conatsers' theory, every streambed in the state of Utah,
regardless of its size and usefulness for floating, would be subject to a
public easement for walking and wading. As a necessary corollary to
such an easement would be the restriction on the ability of all private
landowners to exclude others from making use of their property, should
that property unfortunately be in the form of a streambed. Because the
state of Utah is literally crisscrossed by thousands of natural streams,
creeks and rivers, some hardly worthy of being designated as such, all
owners of property where one of these bodies is located would be subject
to a public easement for anyone to walk across their property. In
essence, every streambed in Utah will become a public thoroughfare.
Such a result is not only unwise but, as a practical matter,
unmanageable. The better-reasoned and more appropriate rule, as
correctly determined by the trial court, is to allow the public to be upon
the waters of this state when such waters are capable of being so used
and to allow no more than incidental use of the streambeds underlying
those waters.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellees respectfully submit that
this Court should affirm the trial court's judgment determining that
where the use of the privately owned streambed of the River is more than
incidental to the right of floating thereon, such use constitutes a
trespass. Appellees further request an award of their costs pursuant to
Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

DATED this
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Attorneys for Appellees
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Defendants.

The court having issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and for the reasons
set forth therein,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs, as members of the public, if they can gain lawful access to the Weber

River, have the right to float leisure craft and participate in any lawful activity when upon the
water.
2.

The defendants have no legal right to prevent plaintiffs from making use of the

public's easement to float down the Weber River.
3.

The defendants have no legal right to erect fences to prevent plaintiffs from

utilizing the public's easement to float down the river.
4.

When floating upon the river, defendants may scrape or touch the river's bed by

grounding of craft as a necessary incident to the use of the public's easement to float upon the
river and do not commit a trespass thereby.
5.

The right to disembark and pull, push, or carry over shoals, rapids, or obstacles

accompanies the right of floatation upon natural waters, which plaintiffs enjoy as members of the
public.
6.

Plaintiffs may walk along the banks of the river to bypass a fence, obstacle, or

danger in order to continue floating and so long as plaintiffs' actions are as minimally intrusive
as possible of the private owners' land, there is no trespass.
7.

Where the use of the streambed is more than incidental to the right of floating on

natural waters, such use would constitute a trespass.
8.

Wading or walking along the river, where such conduct is not incidental to the right

of floatation upon natural waters, would constitute a trespass of private property rights.
2

9.

Plaintiffs have the right to make use of the river provided they stay within the

bounds of the holding of J.J.N.P. Co. v. State Div. of Wildlife Res.. 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982)
and this Judgment.
10. This declaratory Judgment is binding only on the parties to this action.
11. Except as to the declaratory relief provided by this Judgment, all claims and causes
of action herein are dismissed and this Judgment constitutes a final Judgment for all purposes.
12. The parties shall bear their own costs.
DATED this

day of

A^f.

2006.
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1

through and he reads the important part of, or recites the

2

important part of Wyoming decision, which is irrespective of

3

the ownership [inaudible] channel of waters and irrespective

4

of their navigability the public has the right to use public

5

waters of this State for floating useable craft - and I think

6

that's the rule in Utah - and that use may not be interfered

7

with or curtailed by any landowner*

8

the public while so lawfully floating in the State's waters

9

to lawfully hunt or fish or do any other things which are not

10

otherwise made unlawful, and then it goes on to say that when

11

waters aren't able to float craft they may be so used when so

12

floating craft is a necessary incident to that use of the bed

13

or channel the waters may be unavoidably scraped or touched.

14

It's also the right of

But again, on the other hand, where the use of a

15

bed or channel is more than incidental to the right of

16

floating use of the waters and the primary use is of the bed

17

or channel rather than the floating, such wading or walking

18

is a trespass upon lands belonging to riparian owner and is

19

unlawful.

20

Counsel for purposes of our case here has conceded

21

that this is not, this is a non-navigable river.

If it were

22

navigable, the point of all that discussion in our memo is

23

that navigability is important for distinguishing rights. If

24

it's a class one navigable river, which we only have maybe

25 I the Green River and Colorado River in the federal standards
39

1

in Utah and Utah Lake and Great Salt Lake, maybe Bear Lake

2

naturally occurring navigable streams where those rights are

3

recognized and the State owns the bottom, that was the, the

4

equal footing doctrine when all of the western states came

5

into union as part of that the state took the charters and

6

enabled legislation passed by Congress gave the State's title

7

to the riverbeds so that pioneers coming through into the

8

west - and this shows you sort of your eastern mentality of

9

what things were like here, the pioneers coming out west

10

could use these corridors of transportation for commerce to

11

be on equal footing with the State's in the east and, you

12

know, that is I think a huge issue if there is a claim that

13

the Weber River meets that standard because we believe that

14

it clearly does not and is something that the Court can take

15

judicial notice of.

16

don't think we need to go there.

17

address the merits, then the merits would be based on the

18

fact that this is a non-navigable river.

19

standard that was stated by the Day Court is applicable, that

20

the landowners here do have the right to utilize their

21

property in a way that they can exclude people from having

22

access to the river over their land.

23

people from floating on the river or if there's incidental

24

contact related to that, that's I think permissible.

25

walking around, stopping, getting out, fishing, walking up on

But since we have that concession I
If the Court's going to

We submit that the

But they can't exclude

But
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)

Defendants.

)

On September 17, 2002, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment. On May 17,
2005, defendants, excepting Shane E. Matthews, cross-moved for summary judgment. The court
heard oral argument on both motions September 30, 2005. Plaintiffs were represented by Gerald
E. Nielson. Defendants were represented by Ronald G. Russell. After full consideration of the

motions, the memoranda of points and legal authorities filed therewith, the Affidavit of Kevin
Conatser, and all other memoranda, pleadings, and papers onfilewith the court, the court makes
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about June 4,2000, plaintiffs put a rubber raft in the Weber River at a public

access point and proceeded tofloatdown the river to another public access point.
2.

Between the public access points, the river crosses parcels of private property.

3.

Whilefloatingthe river, the plaintiffs touched the streambed in the following ways:

(i) the raft in which they were riding touched or skidded along the bottom of the river in shallow
areas, (ii) the paddles or oars touched the bottom on occasion, (iii) Kevin Conatser's fishing
tackle came in contact with the bottom, and (iv) Kevin Conatser intentionally got out of the raft
and walked along the streambed to facilitate his fishing and to manipulate fencing that had been
strung over the river.
4.

On at least two occasions prior to June 4, 2000, the defendants informed the

plaintiffs that they were trespassing. On one occasion, defendant Michael McMillan confronted
Kevin Conatser and ordered him off the river. On another occasion, Kevin Conatser was ordered
off the river by Clark Sessions.
5.

On June 4,2000, defendants Duane Johnson and Wayne Johnson confronted the

plaintiffs and ordered them off the river. Defendants Duane Johnson and Wayne Johnson told
the plaintiffs to pick up their raft out of the river and walk out via a parallel railroad easement.
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6.

The plaintiffs continued downstream to a public access point where the defendants

Duane Johnson and Wayne Johnson and a Morgan County Deputy Sheriff were waiting.
7.

The deputy sheriff cited plaintiffs for criminal trespass.

8.

The Morgan County Justice Court later found plaintiffs guilty of criminal trespass.

9.

The plaintiffs appealed the justice court's findings.

10.

After appeal, the county moved to dismiss the trespass charges in light of the

uncertainty regarding the Conatsers' status as trespassers.
11.

There is a longstanding and continuing uncertainty between the plaintiffs and

defendants regarding the plaintiffs' rights to use the river.
12.

Both the plaintiffs and defendants have actively sought to assert the rights each sid

believes the law provides to them. Their dispute comes not from a disregard of the law, but a
genuine uncertainty as to their respective rights.
13.

The parties' dispute regarding use of the river has not ceased but has been placed

on hold out of respect for the role of the courts.
14.

The parties have provided the court with no evidence of whether the river has been

used for commerce or of the river's capability to be so used.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes the court to declare the respective

rights or status between parties.
2.

The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to settle and afford relief from

uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.
3

3.

The Declaratory Judgment Act is intended to be remedial without requiring parties

to get in serious trouble first and it is to be liberally administered.
4.

The following four requirements must be met before the court can issue a

declaratory judgment: (i) there must be a justiciable controversy, (ii) parties whose interests are
diverse, (iii) a legally protectible interest residing with the party seeking relief, and (iv) issues
ripe for judicial determination.
5.

The Declaratory Judgment Act allows for a wide interpretation of what constitutes

a justiciable controversy. This case presents a justiciable controversy, ripe for judicial
determination, between private citizens whose interests are adverse, and have been so over time,
regarding the rights and limitations of the plaintiffs when floating the river abutting and running
over defendants' property.
6.

A justiciable controversy is present in this case. Because the plaintiffs' interests to

the river are in direct conflict with the defendants' attempts to prevent the plaintiffs' use of the
river, the parties are adverse.
7.

The issue here is ripe for determination. The plaintiffs have had clashes with the

defendants presenting a concrete set of facts regarding the plaintiffs' actual use of the river. This
case does not present an academic controversy and it is not an effort by plaintiffs to obtain an
advisory opinion.
8.

The plaintiffs have a legally protectible interest in the controversy. The river

belongs to the public and plaintiffs, as members of the public, have a legally protectible interest
in the public easement over these natural waters free of defendants' interference. Plaintiffs have
4

repeatedly used a portion of the river. The defendants have interfered with the plaintiffs' use of
the river. Plaintiffs Kevin Conatser and Jodi Conatser were arrested and convicted of criminal
trespass, although the charges were later dismissed.
9.

The plaintiffs' interest is apart from the general public. The plaintiffs have

repeatedly used a particular portion of the river, intend to continue doing so, and have suffered a
particularized injury of interference. The defendants have individually interfered with the
plaintiffs' use of the river on multiple occasions.
10.

A legally protectible interest does not require a property interest.

11.

A declaratory judgment will end the uncertainty and therewith the instant

controversy.
12.

The plaintiffs have requested a broad declaration of plaintiffs' and the public's

rights to use the river and waters located in Utah; however, a declaratory judgment only settles
the legal rights between the parties to the proceeding. The court's judgment will not exceed the
plaintiffs' interests or prejudice any persons who have not been made a party to the proceeding.
For this reason, the court cannot consider the broad relief requested by the plaintiffs.
13.

The court can only declare the rights to use of the river as between the plaintiffs

and defendants.
14.

A fair determination as to the respective rights between the defendants and

plaintiffs on claims arising from their own behavior will not prejudice any person not made a
party to this case. Therefore, the State of Utah and the record owners of the property in question
are not necessary parties.
5

15.

The court denies plaintiffs' request for a declaration that the public has a right to

walk along the beds of streams and rivers. Such a declaration would require the weighing of
competing interests and is a matter better left for the legislature.
16.

A declaratory judgment will end the present controversy. This case is ideally

situated to the stated purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act. This case is properly before the
court and a declaration of the respective rights between the plaintiffs and defendants is
appropriate.
17.

The declaration made by the court in this case is binding only on those made

parties hereto and no one else.
18.

The court exercises its discretion to grant a declaratory judgment in this case

because it feels that it is the place of a court to obviate future potential confrontations between
the parties and to facilitate a peaceful co-existence. Otherwise, people resort to self-help and
anarchy.
19.

This case does not require either a determination of bed ownership or navigability.

20.

All waters in the state are the property of the public. Individuals, therefore, have

no ownership interest in natural waters.
21.

The public does not trespass when upon natural waters, regardless of who owns the

bed beneath the water.
22.

Irrespective of the ownership of the bed and irrespective of the navigability of the

water, the public, if it can gain lawful access to a body of water, has the right to float leisure craft
and participate in any lawful activity when upon the water.
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23.

The right to be on public waters applies to the section of the river at issue in this

case.
24. The defendants have no legal right to prevent plaintiffs from making use of the
public's easement to float down the river.
25.

The defendants have no legal right to erect fences to prevent the plaintiffs from

utilizing the public's easement tofloatdown the river.
26. Whenfloatingdown the river, a person may scrape or touch the river's bed by
grounding of craft. These are necessary incidents to the use of the easement and do not
constitute trespass.
27. The right to disembark and pull, push, or carry over shoals, rapids, or obstacles
accompanies the right offloatationon natural waters.
28. A person may walk along the banks in order to bypass a fence, obstacle, or danger
in order to continue floating.
29. Provided a person is as minimally intrusive of the private owners' land as possible
there is no trespass.
30. Where the use of the streambed is more that incidental to the right offloatingon
natural waters, such use constitutes a trespass.
31.

Plaintiffs have the right to make use of the river provided they stay within the

bounds of the holding of J.J.N.P. Co. v. State Div. of Wildlife Res.. 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982)
and this decision.
32. This decision is binding only on the parties hereto.
7

33.

The court will enter a declaratory judgment consistent with the foregoing

conclusions.
DATED this

^ 7 day of

faff.

2006.

BY THE COURT:

u

Honorable Michael D/L^n
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Gerald E. Nielson, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Ronald G. Russell, Esq.
Royce B. Covington, Esq. of
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants Lynn Brown,
Duane Johnson, Wayne Johnson,
Michael McMillan, and Randy Sessions
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the (^ -^day of April, 2006 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, postage prepaid,
to:
Gerald E. Nielson, Esq.
3737 Honeycut Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Parker M. Nielson, Esq.
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kelly W. Wright, Esq.
Post Office Box 886
48 West Young Street
Morgan, Utah 84050
Brent A. Bohman, Esq.
157 North Commercial Street, Suite 3
Post Office Box 120
Morgan, Utah 84050
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SECOND DISTRICT
HORCAN COUNTY

Of JUL 30 AM 9 : 3 2
Brent A. Bohman (#4275)
157 North Commercial Street, Suite 3
P.O. Box 120
Morgan, Utah 84050
Attorney for Wayne Johnson, Clark Sessions,
Duane Johnson, Randy Session, Michael McMillan
and Lynn Brown
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN THE FOR MORGAN COUNTY, UTAH
JODI CONATSER, KEVIN CONATSER,
LACEY CONATSER, and NICOLE MANN,
Plaintiffs,
AFFIDAVIT OF
RANDY SESSIONS

vs.
WAYNE JOHNSON, CLARK SESSION,
SHANE E. MATTHEWS, Deputy Sheriff of
Morgan County, DUANE JOHNSON,
RANDY SESSION, MICHAEL McMILLAN,
LYNN BROWN, GERALD STOUT, JOHN
and JANE DOES, 6-25,

Civil No.: 500092
Judge W. Brent West

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF /tyfrvCLis/i

ss.
)

I, Randy Sessions, being first duly sworn, do hereby state as follows:
1.

I am a defendant in the above captioned lawsuit wherein Plaintiffs seek a

declaratory order determining the right of the public in and to the bed of the Weber River.

00042

2.

Contrary to the allegations of the Complaint, however, I do not personally

own or claim to own any interest in any lands which constitute the bed of the Weber
River.
3.

Further Affiant sayeth not.

DATED this ^ 1 day of July, 2001.

<^t^^Qr>i~
Randy Sessions
_ -tr"
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, RANDY SESSIONS, on this 9- 6
day of July, 2001.

NotQTJSbh^

?

*

My Commission Expires:

X&» •'*•?.

JAYNE K THOMPSON

WWoi m
£ &S&& *o»wir mm • STATE

%Mj

5015 WEST OLD HWY RO
MORGAN, UT 84050

COMM. EXR 01-06-2003

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Jf

I hereby certify that on this *%Q day of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Randy Sessions be mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Gerald E. Nielson
3737 Honeycut Road
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MORGAN COUNJTX, STATF..OF UTAH
***

V" Cm

JODICONATSER, KEVIN CONATSER,
LACEY CONATSER, and NICOLE
MANN,
Plaintiffs,
'/f,r

vs.

WAYNE JOHNSON, CLARK
SESSIONS, SHANE E. MATTHEWS,
Deputy Sheriff of Morgan County,
DUANE JOHNSON, RANDY
SESSIONS, MICHAEL McMILLAN,
LYNN BROWN, GERALD STOUT,
JOHN and JANE DOES 6-25.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
GRANTING DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT
Civil No. OSOyOl817Judge Michael D. Lyon

Defendants.

This action for a declaratory judgment arises out of a dispute between these
parties regarding the Plaintiffs' rights to use a portion of the Weber River. The Plaintiffs
moved for summary judgment on September 17,2002. The Court previously granted a
motion to dismiss Defendant Shane E. Matthews. On September 30, 2005, the remaining
Defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the Defendants' claims. The Court
heard oral argument on September 30,2005. Following the hearing, both parties
submitted supplemental briefs on the issue of Plaintiffs' standing. Having now carefully
considered the parties' briefs and having heard argument, the Court denies the
Defendants' motion in part and gives a declaratory judgment.

it
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Background
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On or about June 4,2000, Plaintiffs put a
rubber raft in the Weber River at a public access point and proceeded to float down the
river to another public access point where they exited the river. Between the public
access points, the river crosses parcels of property that are in private ownership.
Plaintiffs touched the streambed in the following ways: (1) the raft in which they rode
touched or skidded along the bottom in shallow areas, (2) their paddles or oars touched
the bottom on occasion, (3) Plaintiff Kevin Conatser's fishing tackle came in contact with
the bottom, (4) Kevin Conatser intentionally got out of the raft, and walked along the
bottom of the river to facilitate his fishing and to manipulate fencing that had been strung
over the river by the property owners.
On two occasions prior to June 4, 2000, the Defendants told the Plaintiffs that
they were trespassing. On June 4,2000, Defendants Duane Johnson and Wayne Johnson
confronted the Plaintiffs and ordered Plaintiffs off of the river. Specifically, Duane and
Wayne Johnson told the Plaintiffs to pick up their raft and walk out via a parallel railroad
easement. The Plaintiffs refused to walk out and continued downstream to a public
access point, where the Johnsons and the Morgan County Deputy Sheriff were waiting
for them. The Deputy Sheriff cited Mr. and Mrs. Conatser for criminal trespass. The
Morgan County Justice Court found the Plaintiffs guilty. After Plaintiffs appeal to the
district court, the county moved to dismiss the charges because of the uncertainty
regarding the Conatsers' status as trespassers.
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Analysis
A. Plaintiffs Meet the Requirements to Seek a Declaratory Judgment
Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes the Court to declare the respective
rights or status between parties. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1. The purpose of the
Declaratory Judgment Act is to "settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity
with respect to rights, status and other legal relations" and it is to be liberally
administered. Id. at § 78-33-12; Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119,121
(Utah 1977) (stating that courts "will be indulgent in entertaining actions to achieve [the
Act's] objective). Nevertheless, four requirements must be met before the Court can give
a declaratory judgment: "(1) there must be a justiciable controversy, (2) parties whose
interests are adverse, (3) a legally protectible interest residing with the party seeking
relief, and (4) issues ripe for judicial determination." Miller v Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 597
(Utah 2003) (citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,1148 (Utah 1983)).
The Declaratory Judgment Act "allows for a wide interpretation of what
constitutes a justiciable controversy." Salt Lake Co. Comm'n v. Short, 985 P.2d 899, 903
(Utah 1999). It is sufficient that the parties are adverse, the plaintiff asserts a bona fide
claim, and the issues are ripe for adjudication. Id. In this case, the parties are adverse as
the Plaintiffs' interests to be on the river are directly in conflict with the Defendants'
attempts to prevent the Plaintiffs' use.
An issue is ripe for determination when it has "sharpened into an actual or
imminent clash of rights" and where the issue presents a concrete set of facts. Pett v.
AutolivASP, Inc , 106 P.3d 705, 706 (stating that a mere difference of opinion regarding
a hypothetical application of the law to a situation in which the parties might one day find
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themselves is unripe). The Plaintiffs have had actual clashes with the Defendants on
several occasions. This case presents a concrete set of facts regarding the Plaintiffs'
actual use of this portion of the Weber River. This case does not present an academic
controversy or require an advisory opinion.
The Plaintiffs must also have a legally protectible interest in the controversy. A
legally protectible interest is "one that the substantive law recognizes as belonging to or
being owned by the party." Alternative Options and Services for Children v. Chapman,
106 P.3d 744, 750 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (quoting In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 1 P.3d
1074 (Utah 2000)). This requires that the plaintiff have an interest that is distinct from
that shared by the general public. Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148-50 (holding that the airing of
generalized grievances and the vindication of public rights are properly addressed to the
legislature). In Jenkins, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment stating that public
schools could not hire state legislators. Id. at 1148. The court held that plaintiffs
reliance on his status as a taxpayer and citizen "d[id] nothing to distinguish himself from
any member of the public at large," and that the plaintiff did not claim any particularized
injury. Id. at 1151 (stating that plaintiff lacked the harm that persons living in the
affected school districts or legislative districts would have).
In this case, the Plaintiffs have repeatedly used a portion of the Weber River. The
Defendants have individually interfered with Plaintiffs' use of the river on multiple
occasions. Plaintiffs Kevin Conatser and Jodi Conatser were arrested and convicted,
although dismissed on de novo appeal, of criminal trespass in the justice court. Although
the Plaintiffs share an interest in using Utah's natural waters with the general public, the
Plaintiffs have also repeatedly used a particular portion of the Weber River, intend to
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continue doing so, and have suffered particularized injury of interference, which sets
them apart from the general public.
A legally protectible interest requires that Plaintiffs' interest be protectible.
Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 597 (Utah 2003). Once given, a declaratory judgment
must be able to provide specific relief. Id. In Miller, the plaintiffs sought a declaration
that a teacher's classroom conduct was unconstitutional. Id. The court refused to give a
declaratory judgment because its declaration would not terminate the uncertainty or end
the controversy. Id. The court noted that a declaratory judgment would not serve a
useful purpose as the teacher would remain employed, students would continue to be
placed in her class, and the school board would still have the discretion to refuse action
on the plaintiffs' complaints. Id. The Defendants argue that a legally protectible interest
requires some property interest. The Court disagrees. Here, the Plaintiffs seek a
declaration of the respective rights between themselves and these Defendants. The Court
finds that there is a longstanding and continuing uncertainty between these parties
regarding Plaintiffs' rights to use this portion of the river. Both the Plaintiffs and the
Defendants have actively sought to assert the rights each side believes the law provides to
them. Their dispute comes not from a disregard of the law, but a genuine uncertainty as
to their respective rights. A declaratory judgment will end this uncertainty and therewith
the controversy.
The Plaintiffs have requested a broad declaration of the public's rights to rivers
and waters in Utah. A declaratory judgment only settles the legal rights between the
parties to the proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11. The Court's judgment will not
exceed the Plaintiffs' interests or prejudice any persons not made parties to the
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proceeding. For this reason, the Court cannot consider the broad relief requested by the
Plaintiffs. The Court will only declare the Plaintiffs' rights to use the river with respect
to these Defendants. Similarly, the Defendants argued that the State of Utah and the
record owners of the property in question are necessary parties. However, a fair
determination as to the respective rights between these particular parties on claims arising
from their own behavior will not prejudice any person not made a party to this case.
The Plaintiffs have asked the Court to declare as a matter of law that the public
has the right to walk along the beds of streams and rivers. Plaintiffs cite to Montana law,
which has recognized this right. See Montana Code Ann. § 23-2-301 et seq. Declaring
such a right would require the weighing of competing interests that is better left for the
legislature. The Court, therefore, denies this relief.
The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to resolve controversies and
uncertainty. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-12. The act is intended to be remedial without
requiring parties to get in serious trouble first. Alternative Options and Services for
Children, 106 P.3d at 749. Prior to June 4,2000, Defendant Michael McMillan
confronted Kevin Conatser and ordered him off the river. Kevin Conatser's Aff. at f 3.
On another occasion prior to June 4,2000, Clark Sessions acting for Randy Sessions
ordered Kevin Conatser off of the river. Id. at If 4. There have been threats of violence
between these parties. Verified Complaint at f 11. The Conatser's were arrested and
convicted of criminal trespass. The Courtfindsthat there has been a continuing
controversy between these parties for years. The Defendants argue that because the
hostilities and use of the river have ceased, a declaratory judgment is inappropriate.
However, the Courtfindsthat the parties' dispute has not ceased, but has been placed on
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hold out of respect for the role of the courts. A declaratory judgment will end this
controversy. This case is ideally suited to the stated purpose of the Declaratory
Judgment Act. The Court, therefore, concludes that this case is properly before the Court
and that a declaration of the respective rights between these parties is appropriate.
B. Plaintiffs' Use of the Public Easement to Float on Natural Waters Does Not
Constitute a Trespass
The parties urge the Court to make a determination of the navigability of the
Weber River. The parties have provided the Court with no evidence of whether the
Weber River has ever been used for commerce or of the river's capability to be so used.
The Court, therefore, will not address navigability on this motion. However, as discussed
below, this case does not require either a determination of bed ownership or navigability.
"All waters" in this state are the property of the public. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1.
Individuals, therefore, have no ownership interest in natural waters. The Utah Supreme
Court has recognized a public easement over natural waters. J.J.N.P. Co. v. State Div. of
Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982). The public does not trespass when upon
natural waters, regardless of who owns the bed beneath the water. Id. "Irrespective of
the ownership of the bed and irrespective of navigability of the water, the public, if it can
obtain lawful access to a body of water, has the right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and
participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water." Id. (citing Day v. Armstrong,
362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). This right to be on public waters applies to the section of the
Weber River at issue in this case. The Defendants have no legal right to prevent the
Plaintiffs from making use of the public's easement to float down the Weber River. The
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Defendants have no legal right to erect fences to prevent the Plaintiffs from utilizing the
public's easement to float down the river.
When floating on natural waters, a person may scrape the river bed or touch the
bed by the grounding of craft. Day, 362 P.2d at 146. These are necessary incidents to the
use of that easement and do not constitute a trespass. Id. at 145-46. Even the "right to
disembark and pull, push, or carry over shoals, rapids, or obstacles accompany the right
of flotation" on natural waters. Id at 146. A person may walk along the banks in order
to bypass an obstacle or danger in order to continue floating. Id. As long as the person is
as minimally intrusive on the private owner's land as possible there is no trespass. Id.
However, where the use of the stream bed is more than incidental to the right of
floating on natural waters, the use constitutes a trespass. Id. This would include wading
or walking along the river. In this case, the Plaintiffs, with the exception of Kevin
Conatser, never left their raft and, therefore, did not trespass on the property in question.
When Kevin Conatser got back in his raft he was no longer trespassing. Walking out
along the parallel railroad easement was unnecessary. These rights are both already
recognized in Utah and in line with the clear majority of western states.
Conclusion
This case presents a justiciable controversy, ripe for judicial determination,
between private citizens whose interests are adverse, and have been so over time,
regarding the rights and limitations of the Plaintiffs when floating the Weber River
abutting the Defendants' property. The Weber River belongs to the public, and the
Defendants, as members of the public, have a legally protectible interest in the public
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easement over these natural waters, free of Defendants' interference, provided they stay
within the bounds of the holding of JJ.N.P. Co.
In granting the circumscribed relief found in this decision, the Court settles the
longstanding and continuing uncertainty and insecurity concerning the parties' rights to
the river. In doing so, it declares the rights of the parties only, no one else. The Court
exercises its discretion to grant a declaratory judgment because it feels that it is the place
of a court to obviate future potential confrontations between the parties and to facilitate a
peaceful co-existence. If courts do not act in these situations in society, people resort to
self-help and anarchy.
The Court requests that Mr. Russell prepare the appropriate findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment.
Dated this

\tf

day of December, 2005.

Michael D. Lybn, Judge

jj
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Supreme Court of Utah.
J.J.N.P. COMPANY, a Utah corporation, PlainMf
and Appellant,
v.
STATE of Utah, By and Through its DI V ISION OF
WII DLIFE RESOURCES, Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 17183.
Sept.. 22, 1982.
Owner of land surrounding lake appealed from, a
judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, David B. Dee, J., upholding the Division of
Wildlife Resources' denial of a permit to establish a
private fish installation, entering a declaratory
judgment that the public had recreational rights in the
waters of the lake even though it was entirely
surrounded by landowners1 property, and ruling that a
dirt road crossing the property was a public road.
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) the
public had recreational rights in the waters of the lake
even though it was entirely surrounded by
landowners' property; (2) the statute prohibiting
private fish installations on natural watercourses, but
allowing them on man-made watercourses, did not
deny equal protection; and (3) where the issue of the
dirt road was not raised in the pleadings, but was
tried by mutual consent, there was no error in
deciding that issue.
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' vch.nai Water Courses
40511(A) Riparian Rights in General
405k36 k. Power to Control and Regulate
Water Courses. Most Cited Cases
State need not show compelling state interest to
justify discrimination between natural and unnatural
watercourses.
[Ill Constitutional Law .92 €^>213.1(2)

Navigable Waters 270 €=>36(5)
270 Navigable Waters
270II Lands Under Water
270k36 Ownership and Control n . »< d
270k36(5) k. Trespass to Subnn .^ ;mds,
and Actions Therefor. Most Cited Cases
Corollary of proposition that public owns water is
rule that there is public easement over water
regardless of who owns water beds beneath water and
therefore, public waters do not trespass in areas
where they naturally appear, and public does not
trespass when upon such waters.
181 Navigable Waters 270 € = * 1 6
270 Navigable Waters
2701 Rights of Public
270kl5 Navigation
270kl6 k. In General Most Cited. Cases
Navigable Waters 270 € ^ > 2 9
270 Navigable Waters
2701 Rights of Public
270k28 Public Uses Other Than Navigation
270k29 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Irrespective of ownership of land and navigability of
water, public, if it can obtain lawful access to body of
water, has right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and
participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that
water.

92 Constitutional Law
92X1 Equal Protection of Laws
92k213.1 Bases for Discrimination Affected in
General
92k213.1(2) k. Rational or Reasonable
•s; Relation to Object or Compelling Interest.
Most Cited Cases
Compelling state interest need be demonstrated only
when discrimination affects fundamental rights or
when suspect classifications are involved.
11} I Constitutional Law 92 €>=>213,1(2)
92 Constitutional Law
92X1 Equal Protection of Laws
92k213.1 Bases for Discrimination.. / VJ'lei tc-d in
General
92k213.1(2) k. Rational or Reasonable
Basis; Relation to Object, or Compelling Interest.
Most Cited Cases
When neither fundamental right nor suspect.
classification is involved,' equal protection requires
that statutory classifications bear reasonable relation
to purpose sought to be accomplished and that there
be reasonable basis for distinction between classes
and classifications are not unreasonable or arbitrary
as long as similarly situated people are dealt with in
similar manner and people situated differently are not
treated as if their circumstances were the same.

191 Waters and Water Courses 405 € ^ 1 0 9
405 Waters and Water Courses
405IV Natural Lakes and Ponds
4Q5kl09 k. Nature and Extent of ,E ipai ian
Rights in General. Most Cited Cases
Ownership of all lands surrounding lake did not
© 2007 Thon...

i .egislation
92k208(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
.-^gislative classifications need not be applied with
• ithematical exactness,
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92 Constitutional Law
92X Class Legislation
92k208 Class Legislation
92k208(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Classification may be rea.son.able even, though some
inequality results.
1|SJ I m i ' I I n l

;il II in M2*5 "

Ml,

«l I llil "I

92 Constitutional Law
92X1 Equal Protection of Laws
92k213.1 Bases for Discrimination Affected in
General.
92k213.1(2) k. ivdu,..i.i
e
Basis; Relation to Object or OV
t.
Most Cited Cases
Discrimination
reasonable basis for classification.

1

)

92 C(
i-rial U\v
9211 Construction, Ope:.-,
• <eiit of
Constitutional Provisions
92k44
Determina:* ^
n^itutional
Questions
92k48 Presumptions and V-norn.-t'on in
Favor of Constitutionals
92k48(4) Appiiv^in s. 4 macular
Legislation or Action *-r to Particular Constitutional
Questions
92k48(6)
k
Classification,
Uniformity and Discrimination; Special or Local.
Laws. Most Cited Cases
Presumption of constitutionality is extended to
statutes not affecting fundamental rights or based on
suspect classifications, and that presumption is
sufficient to sustain constitutionality of classification
created by statute unless classification creates
invidious discrimination or bears no rational
relationship to legitimate state purpose.
U21 Constitutional Law lLl2 <^23<>
92 Constitutional Law
92X1 Equal Protection of Laws
92k236 k. Game and Fish Laws. Most Cited
Cases
Fish. 176 € = > 9
176 Fish

176k9 k. COILS,
Most Cited Cases
Statute prohibiting operation ri , • ate fish
installations on natural waters or on reservoirs
constructed on natural stream channels, but allowing
such installations on man-made watercourses, did not
deny equal protection, notwithstanding fact that State
allowed such private fish installations where
installations were constructed prior to effective date
of statute, U.C.A.1953. 23-15-10.
1181 Appeal and E r r o r 30 € = ^ 8 8 9 ( 3 )
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
3QXVKD) Amendments
30k889 Amendments Regarded as Made
30k889(3) k. To Conform to Evidence or
Correspond with V e ^ i* * * nr * > • -i <•> m/» n t. Most Cited
Cases
There was no error in deciding issue tried by mutual
consent though it was not raised in pleadings.

'lIO-M-ill: -

md appellant.
ivoi;crt B. Hansen, Richard i
i>aii n \\
Jensen, Michael M. QueaL
"it.
defendant and respondent
STEWART, Justice:
JJ.N.P. Co. brought this at-tion . naiJengin^ >r, ^.,I..J
protection grounds, the constitutionality of U.C.A.,
1953. S 2 3 - 1 5 - 1 0 r m which prohibits the operation
of private fish installations on natural waters or on
reservoirs constructed on natural stream channels.
The plaintiff also challenges the Division of Wildlife
Resources' denial of a permit to establish a private
fish installation and the trial court's adjudication of
the State's claim that a dirt road crossing plaintiffs
property is a public road.
The State of Utah
counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the
public has recreational rights in the waters of a
natural lake even though it is entirely surrounded by
plaintiffs land. The trial court ruled in favor of the
State on all. issues. W e affirm,

states:
:
- • -rilawful for any person to develop or
wj^mi; a private fish installation without
..first securing a certificate of registration
from the division of wildlife resources and
payment of fees as specified by the wildlife
board. This private fish installation must be

© 2007 Thomson/West N< » CL lim t« > Orig 1 J S G » \ t ; i I
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operated undei the rules and regulations
specified by the wildlife board, and no such
installation shall be developed on natural
lakes or natural flowing streams, or
reservoirs constructed on natural stream
channels.
J.J.N.P., a limited partnership created under the laws
of Utah, owns approximately 1200 acres in Lake
Canyon, Duchesne County. Lake Canyon Lake is a
natural lake surrounded on all sides by property
owned by J.J.N.P. The lake is approximately 800
yards long and 200 yards wide, with a mean depth of
17 feet and a maximum depth of 33 feet. The lake is
fed by natural springs in its bed and a small stream
approximately 24 to 36 inches wide and 3 inches
deep at full course, with headwaters approximately
six miles above the lake on State land. A stream of
similar size flows intermittently out of the lake
during high water levels for approximately 300 yards
before it disappears into the ground.
Prior to 1978, the State had an agreement with
J.J.N.P.'s predecessors in interest allowing public
access to the lake across their land.— The State
managed the lake, eliminated trash fish, stocked
trout, and set and enforced fishing seasons and limits.
When this agreement expired, J.J.N.P. filed an
application with the Division of Wildlife Resources
for a permit for a private fish installation.
The
Division denied the application pursuant to § 23-1510, which provides in part that "no such [private fish]
installation shall be developed on natural waters or
natural flowing streams, or reservoirs constructed on
natural stream channels."

FN2. The record does not include a copy of
the lease executed between JJ.N.P.'s
predecessor in interest and the State of Utah.
Testimony at trial, however, indicated that
under the terms of the lease, the State
managed the waters and performed certain
duties with the permission of the owners.

for pnvaic :^ii.*>h
issued annua IK

;

A gravel road extends u-.a, .„.. mwuw. v> Lake
Canyon past Lake Canyon Lake to U.S. Forest
Service lands. For more than ten years, Duchesne
County graded and maintained the road for public
use. J.J.N.P. attempted to restrict access to its *1136
lands, and necessarily the government lands beyond,
by placing a gate across the gravel road. County
officials and others removed the obstructions within
24 hours, and J.J.N.P. abandoned the effort.

I.RIGHT:

* ..i-, 4 ..

-

;i

[1][2][3] The Stale m its counterclaim asserts that
Lake Canyon Lake is navigable and therefore subject
to a public servitude for recreational use. Although
"navigability" is a standard used to determine title to
waterbeds, Monroe v. State. I l l Utah L 175 P.2d
759 (19461 it does not establish the extent of the
State's interest in the waters of the State.
See
Comment, Basis for the Legal Establishment of a
Public Right of Recreation in Utah's "NonNavigable" Waters, 5 J.Contemp.L. 95 (1978).
Section 73-1-1 states: "All waters in this state,
whether above or under the ground are hereby
declared to be the property of the public, subject to
all existing rights to the use thereof." (Emphasis
added.)
Thus, individuals have no ownership
interest as such in natural waters, only the right to put
the water to certain uses. m "Beneficial use shall be
the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the
use of water in this state," § 73-1-3, and the right to
beneficial use may be acquired only by compliance
with the legal procedures for appropriation of a given
right.
But appropriation does not confer an
ownership interest in the water itself. Daniels
Irrigation Co. v. Daniel Summit Co.. Utah, 571 P.2d
1323 (1977): Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water
& Elec. Power Co.. 24 Utah 249. 67 P. 672 (1902).

Seven miles below Lake Canyon Lake is another
natural lake known as "Lower Lake" which sustains a
private fish installation. At trial, Donald Andriano,
Chief of Fisheries for the Division of Wildlife
Resources, testified that the initial permit authorizing
this fishery was issued before the Legislature enacted
§ 23-15-10 in 1971 and that the Division renewed
the permits yearly because the owner had made
substantial investments in the lake property.
Andriano testified that fewer than six such permits
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to <

FN3. In Adams v. Portage Irrigation.
Reservoir & Power Co.. 95 Utah 1. 72 P.2d
648 (1937), this Court stated:
Waters in this state are of two classes, public
waters and private waters. The latter class
is not only subject to exclusive control and
ownership, but may be used, sold, or wasted.
It: consists of such waters only as have been
reduced to actual, physical possession of an
individual by being taken into his vessels or
storage receptacles. It is private property
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(Cite as: 655 P.2d 1133)
and may be
.:
/. Public
waters, on th*
.
the subject
of larceny \
*u mereto is in the public;
all are equal i ^neis. that is. have coequal
rights therein, and -JIIL cannot obtain the
exclusive control thereof. These waters are
the gift of Providence; they belong to all as
nature placed them or made them available.
They are the waters flowing in natural
channels or ponded in natural lakes and
reservoirs. The title thereto is not subject to
private acquisition and barter, even by the
federal government or the state itself.... no
title to the corpus of the water itself has been
or can be granted, while it is naturally
flowing, any more than it can to the air or
the winds or the sunshine. "Such water,"
says Blackstone, "is a movable, wandering
thing," ... like wild birds on the wing.
Id. at 11. 72 P.2d at 652-53.
See also
Deseret Livestock v. Sharp. 123 Utah 353,
259 P.2d 607 (1953).
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*1137 [8] Private ownership of the land underlying
natural lakes and streams does not defeat the State's
power to regulate the use of the water or defeat
whatever right the public has to be on the water.
Irrespective of the ownership of the bed and
navigability of the water, the public, if it can obtain
lawful access to a body of water, has the right to float
leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful
activity when utilizing that water.
Day v.
Armstrong. Wvo.. 362 P.2d 137 (1961): Southern
Idaho Fish and Game Association v. Picabo
Livestock. Inc.. 96 Idaho 360. 528 P.2d 1295 (1974).
FN4

I 'N4 i\ number of state jurisdictions have
found a public right to recreation in public
waters: California, People v. Sweetser, 72
Cal.App.3d 278. 140 Cal.Rptr. 82 (1977):
People v. Mack. 19 Cal.App.3d 1040. 97
Cal.Rptr. 448 (1971): Idaho, Southern
Idaho Fish and Game Assrn v. Picabo
Livestock. Inc.. 96 Idaho 360. 528 P.2d 1295
(1974): Minnesota, Johnson v. Seifert. 257
Minn. 159. 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960):
Missouri, Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835,
269 S.W.2d 17 (1954): New Mexico. State
v. Red River Valley Co.. 51 N.M. 207. 182
P.2d 421 (1945): North Dakota. Roberts v.
Taylor. 47 N.D. 146. 181 N.W. 622 (1921):
Oklahoma, Curry v. Hill. 460 P.2d 933
(1969): Oregon, Luscher v. Reynolds. 153
Or. 625. 56 P.2d 1158 (1936): South
Dakota, Hillebrand v. Knapp. 65 S.D. 414.
274 N.W. 821 (1937): Washington. Snivelv
v. Jaber. 48 Wash.2d 815. 296 P.2d 1015
(1956). Kemp v. Putnam. 47 Wash.2d 530.
288 P.2d 837 (1955): Wyoming, Day v.
Armstrom. 362P.2d 137 (1961).

[4] [5] [6] The State regulates the use of the water, in
effect, as trustee for the benefit of the people. Tanner
v. Bacon. 103 Utah 494. 516. 136 P.2d 957. 966-967
(1943) (Larson, J., concurring).
Accord Day v.
Armstrong. Wvo.. 362 P.2d 137 (1961): see also NeBo-Shone Association v. Hogarth, 1 F.Supp. 885
(W.D.Mich.1934). affd, 81 F.2d 70 (6th Or. 1936).
Public ownership is founded on the principle that
water, a scarce and essential resource in this area of
the country, is indispensable to the welfare of all the
people; and the State must therefore assume the
responsibility of allocating the use of water for the
benefit and welfare of the people of the State as a
whole. The doctrine of public ownership is the basis
upon which the State regulates the use of water for
the benefit and well being of the people. Marks v.
Whitney. 6 Cal.3d 251. 491 P.2d 374. 98 Cal.Rptr.
790(1971).
*t

[7] A corollary of the proposition that the public
owns the water is the rule that there is a public
easement over the water regardless of who owns the
water beds beneath the water.
Therefore, public
waters do not trespass in areas where they naturally
appear, and the public does not trespass when upon
such waters. Day v. Armstrong, Wvo., 362 P.2d 137
(1961).
Furthermore, state policy recognizes an
interest of the public in the use of state waters for
recreational purposes by requiring that recreational
uses be considered by the State Engineer before he
approves an application for appropriation, § 73-3-8,
or permits the relocation of a stream., § 73-3-29.
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based solely on its ownership of the
surrounding land. It has no tight of appropiiation
granted by the State bngmee:
lo permit the
acquisition of water rights in the manner claimed
would violate the public ownership doctrine and the
state statutes regulating appropriation. State water
law excludes every means of appropriation except by
application to the State Engineer. U.C.A.. 1953. §
73-3-1.

II.EQI J M PR OTEC HON
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J. J.N .P. attacks § 23-15-10 on equal protection
grounds under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, § 24 of the
Utah Constitution.
The argument is that the
statutory classification which prohibits private fish
installations on natural watercourses, reservoirs on
such watercourses, and lakes, but allows them on
manmade
watercourses,
constitutes
an
unconstitutional discrimination. It is also contended
that the State, in allowing a private fish installation
on Lower Lake, a natural watercourse, discriminates
against J J.N.P. In addition, plaintiff argues that §
23-15-10, read in light of § 23-20-14, which
empowers property owners to exclude hunters and
fishermen from their property,, is unreasonable and
arbitrary
flO][ll] As part of its equal protection argument,
J.J.N.P. contends that the State must show a
compelling state interest to justify a discrimination
between natural and unnatural watercourses. The
argument is without merit.
A compelling state
interest need be demonstrated only when the
discrimination affects fundamental rights or when
suspect classifications are involved.
Utah Public
Employees' Association v. State, Utah, 610 P.2d 1272
(1980). The building or maintaining of a private fish
installation on public water is not a fundamental
right, and the restriction of such installations to
manmade watercourses is not. a suspect classification.
[12][13][[14][15] When neither a fundamental right
nor a suspect classification is involved, equal
protection requires that statutory classifications bear
a reasonable relation to the purpose sought to be
accomplished and that there be a reasonable basis for
the distinction between the classes. Classifications
are not unreasonable or arbitrary as long as similarly
situated people are dealt with in a similar manner and
people situated differently are not treated as if their
circumstances were the same.
Abrahamsen v.
Industrial Commission. 3 Utah 2d 289. 283 P.2d 213
(1955): State v. Mason. 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920
(1938).
Legislative classifications need not be
applied with mathematical exactness. Baker v.
Matheson. Utah. 607 P.2d 233 (1979).
A
classification may be reasonable even though some
inequality results. Crowder v. Salt Lake County.
Utah. 552 P.2d 646 (1976). Thus, *1138 the law
holds a discrimination invalid only if there is no
reasonable basis for the classification. Leetham v.
McGinn. Utah. 524 P.2d 323 (1974); Justice v.
Standard Gilsonite Co.. 12 Utah 2d 357. 366 P.2d
974 (1961).

[16] A presumption of constitutionality is extended to
statutes not affecting fundamental rights or based on
suspect classifications, and that presumption is
sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of the
classification created by a statute unless the
classification creates an. invidious discrimination or
bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose. Baker v. Matheson. Utah, 607 P.2d 233
(1979); Purdie v. University of Utah. Utah. 584 P.2d
831 (1978); San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1. 93 S.Ct. 1278. 36 L.Ed.2d
16(1973).
[17] In prohibiting private fish installations on natural
courses, j§ 23-15-10 does not impose an
•ous discrimination. The State has the right, as
r
<^f all waters in the State, to prevent private
om using public waters for private uses,
ommercial or otherwise. The statute in
j K»n nrotects that right and serves to preserve
; for public use and enjoyment,
> v^ who owns the bed or surrounding land.
ore, the State may lawfully prevent the
bjects in the water, such as would
. « fishery, to preserve the natural
.es and to protect whatever native
wildlife may make use of the water. Fisheries on..
appropriated waters in manmade channels do not
interfere with any of the above purposes.
We
conclude that § 23-15-10 promotes legitimate state
interests and that the classification between natural
and manmade watercourses is reasonable. It follows
that the statute is constitutional
Furthermore, L.LN ;! -- iu d a-!h-i-.;iit position than
parties who operate private fish installations on
unnatural watercourses. For water to reach unnatural
watercourses it must, be appropriated and. diverted.
Appropriated water is to be used for the purposes
stated in the application. J.J.N.P. has limited water
rights in. the w a t e r , " but it does not own the water in
the lake even though the lake is surrounded by
J.J.N.P. land.

FN5. J.J.N.P. does possess a diligence claim
entitling it to use Lake Canyon Lake water
for watering cattle. J.J.N.P. has applied to
the State Engineer to appropriate water for
irrigation of its land, but the record does not
show that this application has been
approved.
J.J.I IP.'s furthei contention that the fish installation
on I ,ower Lake violates its right to equal protection is

© 2007 1 h )iiisoii/Vl("*;( No I hum to (jug US Unst. Works.
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also unpei suasive. Section 23-15-10 was enacted in
1971, after the Lower Lake installation was built.
The statute contains no express grandfather provision
for fish installations on natural watercourses existing
at the time of passage of the act. However, the
statute does differentiate between old and new fish
installations. As to the latter, the statute prohibits
the development of all new installations on natural
waters.
As to the former, fish installations that
already existed in natural water at the time the act
was passed could continue to operate under
certification by the Division of Wildlife Resources.
The Division, congruent with the act, has annually
renewed the Lower Lake permit in recognition of the
owner's financial investment in, the then existing
facilities.
J.J.N.P. also argues that § 23-15-10, in prohibiting
private fisheries on natural watercourses, is
inconsistent with a landowner's right to exclude
sportsmen from his property pursuant to § 23-20-14.
J.J.N.P. asserts that § 23-15-10!s purpose is to
provide the public with fishing areas and, because
private landowners may restrict public access to
natural waters, that purpose is unachievable in the
instant case. That conclusion does not follow. The
right to use public waters for pleasure purposes is no
less a right just because some landowners, for reasons
sufficient to themselves, prohibit public access over
their land to reach those public waters.— Clearly,
J.J.N.P. *1139 could prohibit all overland access to
Lake Canyon Lake, However, access to bodies or
streams of water is not necessary to the securing of
certain legitimate state interests, such as the
protection, of wildlife. Furthermore, remote bodies
of water are now accessible by air.

FN6. As to wneine
s an
easement in the beds
ikes,
we express no opinion
ules
compare Southern Idaho i^n una dame
Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock. Inc., 96 Idaho
360. 528 P.2d 1295 (19741. with Day v.
Armstrong. Wvo.. 362 P.2d 137 (19611
The contention that the State wrongfully denied
J.J.NJVs application for a permit is not supportable.

I'll THF niH'l IM "UH
[181 The trial court concluded that the dirt road
through Lake Canyon was a public road. J.J.N.P.
does not challenge the correctness of that conclusion,
'•"i 200'niiinnimii VVVst N<i \ (aim

but rather contends that the trial court should not
have decided the issue since it was not raised on the
pleadings.
Although the issue was not properly
pleaded, the record plainly indicates that both parties
litigated the issue of the road. "When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in
all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.... [F]allure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues."
Rule 15(b),
U.R.Civ.P. Treating actually litigated issues as if
they had been properly pleaded serves the ends of
:
--ice, whether the pleadings are actually amended
•ot. First Security Bank of Utah v. Colonial
ih, 597 P.2d 859 (1979). Since the issue
wa& mud by mutual consent, there was no error in
deciding the issue.
A H W > .*-*-.

S, and HOWL, J! and T TT VRLAN BI JRNS,
K
idge. concur.
1, J,, does not participate herein; BURNS,
a Judge, Nat
hief Just;

i :

Aty jpin; v « *«*«, w jwincdte a legitimate
state purpose for distinguishing natural lakes and
streams from manmade watercourses and, indeed, it
appears that there is none,
r^uitiff
Vo.\woversy in this ca^ ai.;>. -M^
!'" Med not to continue the lease to the Stan by
• its predecessors in interest granted access to
, . j.ablic across their land during the winter months
for ice fishing. Since the public no longer had any
access to the lake, the Division refused to stock the
water with fish. Plaintiff then undertook to stock the
lake, and applied to the Division for permission to do
so. But because the lake is natural, only the Division
has the right to stock the waters with fish. Pursuant
to the provisions of U.C.A.. 1953, 23-15-10., by
prohibiting a private installation, the State has
reserved to itself the exclusive right to engage in the
fish hatchery business. •
I am unable to determine that the statute promotes
any public purpose.
As acknowledged by Mr.
Andriano in his testimony before the court, the sole
reason for the statutory enactment was to afford the
public a right to fish the natural lakes of this state.
Notwithstanding the worthiness of that purpose,
application of the statute in the instant case does not
provide the public with a fishing site that v* ould
otherwise be unavailable. The public has a right to
r-h 'hese wMtcis. but the right is not absolute. The
k-<5
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public must first gain lawful access to the waters
without trespassing upon the land in private
ownership.
Plaintiff has asserted its common law right to keep its
private property private, which it has every right to
do. The right to private property is one of our oldest
and most cherished rights, and is protected against
unauthorized invasion by the State by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and by Article
I, Section 22, Constitution of Utah. But how does
releasing fish into the waters by someone other than
the State violate the public's interests in the water?
The majority opinion's assertion that raising fish in
the lake somehow *1140 converts the public waters
to private waters seems to me a nonsequitur^

promote any legitimate state purpose, and I would
therefore reverse the district court's judgment.
Utah,1982.
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, By and Through Div. of
Wildlife Resources
655 P.2d 1133
END OF DOCUMENT

FN1. It might be asserted that such fish
would continue to be the private property of
plaintiff so that the public could not take the
fish from the lake even if lawful access to
the waters was gained. But see U.C.A..
1953, 23-13-8. where it is provided that
wildlife which escapes from a private
wildlife farm becomes the property of the
State. Though we do not have a similar
statute with respect to fish, reason would
dictate that if plaintiff voluntarily releases
fish into public waters it relinquishes control
over its private property and the fish may
thereafter be caught and taken by any
member of the public.
There is no issue here concerning the possibility of
polluting the public waters or of the introduction of
trash fish into the waters. The Division has power to
regulate all private fish installations under the statute
and plaintiff does not contend that it would escape
regulation because of its ownership of the land
surrounding the lake.
The majority opinion initially acknowledges that the
waters in question are the property of the public but
thereafter erroneously asserts that the State is the
owner of the waters and as owner the State has the
right to prevent private citizens from using the public
waters for private uses. The State is not the owner of
public waters; the ownership is in the public itself.
As members of the public, the owners of plaintiff
corporation cannot be deprived of making use of the
public waters, as long as such use does not interfere
with prior rights to use such water.
I am of the view that the statute fails as it does not
© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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DAYv. ARMSTRONGWyo. 1961
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Kenneth DAY and John Rouse, Appellants
(Defendants below),
v.
J. Reuel ARMSTRONG, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
R. K. Stewart, Dee G. Johnson, Charles E. Piersall,
C. K. 'Buddy' Faught, Dr. Will Schunk, William C.
Jensen, Carroll Noble, John C. Borzea, Verg Teeters,
Intervenors
R. K. STEWART, Dee G. Johnson, Charles E.
Piersall, C. K. 'Buddy' Faught, Dr. Will Schunk,
William C. Jensen, Carroll Noble, John C. Borzea,
Verg Teeters, Appellants (Intervenors below),
v.
J. Reuel ARMSTRONG, Appellee (Plaintiff below),
and
Kenneth Day and John Rouse, Appellees (Defendants
below).
Nos. 2961,2966.
May 23,1961.
Action for declaratory judgment respecting rights of
plaintiff and those of public to go upon specified
river channel as it flows across the defendants' lands.
The District Court, Carbon County, Glen G. Stanton,
J., entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the
defendants appealed.
The Supreme Court,
Harnsberger, J., held that the public had a right to
float upon stream regardless of whether it was
navigable or nonnavigable and statute attempting to
regulate streams upon which public might float was
unconstitutional because of its vagueness and its
attempt to punish things not made criminal.
Reversed in part and remanded with directions.
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*138 Bard Ferrall and John F. Lynch of Greenwood,
Ferrall, Bloomfield, Osborn & Lynch, Cheyenne, for
Kenneth Day and John Rouse.
Norman B. Gray, Atty. Gen., and George J. Argeris,
Asst. Atty. Gen., appearing amicus curiae.
Byron Hirst, Cheyenne, for R. K. Stewart and others.
J. Reuel Armstrong, Rawlins, pro se.
Before
BLUME,
C.
J.,
and
PARKER,
HARNSBERGER, and McINTYRE, JJ.
Mr. Justice HARNSBERGER delivered the opinion
of the court.
Plaintiff in March, 1958, sought judgment declaring
his rights and those of the *139 public, under
applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution, the
State Constitution, the laws of Wyoming, and judicial
decisions, to go upon the channel, between its high
water marks, and to float upon the waters of the
North Platte River where it flows upon and across
defendants' lands.
Defendants denied plaintiffs and the public's right to
either use the channel or to float upon the waters of
the river as they crossed their lands, but joined in
asking a declaratory judgment.
The State of Wyoming by its Attorney General was
allowed to appear as amicus curiae.
Other parties permitted to intervene likewise asked
for declaratory judgment, but claimed for the public
only the right to float upon or within the waters of the
river as it flowed upon and across the lands of the
defendants.
During the course of the action, the Thirty-Fifth State
Legislature enacted Ch. 205, S.L. of Wyoming, 1959,
§ § 41-527, 41-528, W.S.1957 (1959 Supp.), the first
section of which provides as follows:
'§ § 41-527. Floating persons and property by boat,
canoe or raft on streams.-Persons and their property
may only float by boat, canoe or raft for any lawful
purpose down that part of any stream in the State of
Wyoming where the records of the state engineer for
the ten years preceding such floating show that part
of the stream to have had an average flow of water
for the month of July exceeding 1,000 cubic feet per
second, and it shall be unlawful to obstruct or prevent
such use of such stream, except only so far as may be
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necessary for the protection of installations now
existing or hereinafter ordered constructed by
authority of the state board of control in furtherance
of the beneficial uses of water; and providing further,
that nothing herein shall be construed as preventing
such fencing by those invested with property rights
and the enjoyment thereof as shall not interfere with
such floating. It shall be unlawful for any person
floating any stream to go upon, shoot over or into,
except with the permission of the owner of such
property, or damage or litter property on either side
of the waters of such stream. In enforcing this act [§
§ 41-527, 41-528], the records of the state engineer
shall be conclusive in any trial in any court of the
State of Wyoming in determining the flow of any
stream. (Laws 1959, ch. 205, § 1.)'

After the passage of this legislation, the intervening
parties filed their motion for summary judgment.
This was denied by the court which granted the
intervenors an exception. Thereafter the matter being
submitted on stipulation of facts and arguments as to
applicable law, the court found there was a justiciable
controversy and a class action for a declaratory
determination of the legal rights, duties and
obligations of the parties; found generally for the
plaintiff and intervenors and against the defendants;
then declared:
'* * * that the Plaintiff, and all others similarly
situated as a class and the Intervenors, have the
public rights and privilege of using the bed, channel
and water of the North Platte River as it flows
through the lands of the Defendants for the following
purposes, and that the Defendants shall not fence or
use said bed and channel, or any part thereof, so as to
interfere with any of the following public purposes
to-wit:
'(a) The right to fish from a boat, or while wading or
walking, so long as those exercising the right stay in
and upon the river bed or well-defined channel, and
have the proper license and permission of the State of
Wyoming;
'(b) The right to walk for any lawful purpose in and
upon said channel or bed;
'(c) The right to boat and float on the water in and
upon said channel;
*140 '(d) The right to hunt in and upon said bed and
channel when hunting is permitted by the State and
within the licensed authority give by the State.
'It is, further ordered that said public rights of the
Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, shall not
embrace the right to camp within and upon said bed
and channel or use the same for recreation other than
enumerated above.

'It is, further, ordered, adjudged and decreed that any
part or parts of Chapter 205 of the Session Laws of
Wyoming, 1959, which limit or prohibit the exercise
by the Plaintiff of the rights above mentioned is
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and of no effect
upon the public rights enumerated herein.'

From this judgment the intervenors appeal 'because
Ch. 205, S.L. of Wyoming, 1959, is constitutional
and determines the rights of the parties,5 and because
the order denying intervenors1 motion for summary
judgment was erroneous.
The defendants also
appeal, but from the whole of the judgment, and they
designate the complete record and all the proceedings
and evidence in the action for inclusion in the record
on appeal. This embodies the pleadings of the
parties, stipulations, the unchallenged representations
of the intervenors1 brief in support of their motion for
summary judgment, uncontradicted
affidavits
submitted in connection therewith, and a brief filed
by Wyoming Wool Growers Association and
Wyoming Stock Growers Association as friends of
the court.
The admitted facts as exhibited by the complaint are:
Defendants own land through which the North Platte
River flows; at intermittent periods the river can float
canoes, rowboats, outboard motors and other floating
craft capable of carrying as many as six people; in the
month of August and until spring run-off, craft
carrying people and drawing more than one foot of
water cannot be floated, with minor exceptions, i. e.,
short stretches or reservoirs; craft drawing less than
one foot of water can be floated carrying people until
about the middle of October when freezing occurs;
from early days until 1940, the river was used
commercially for floating logs, ties and timber;
plaintiff can enter the river by boat from lands of a
national forest, by boat or wading, or from a point
where the county road right of way crosses the
channel, or by boat or wading from lands of other
private owners, and the channel may sometimes be
entered between high water marks by walking.
Plaintiff, for himself and the public, claims the right
to use the bed and channel of the river and its waters
to fish under license of the State, either from a boat
floating upon the river waters, or while wading the
waters, or walking within the well-defined channel of
the stream; to walk in and upon the river's channel; to
boat and float upon the waters of the river; to hunt
under State license in and upon the channel of the
river; and to camp within and upon the channel of the
river and use it for recreation. Plaintiff also claims
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neither of the defendants owns the bed of the river,
but if they do hold title to the channel, that title is
subject to the paramount right of the public to use the
channel for the enumerated purposes, and defendants
may not be legally fence the channel or otherwise
obstruct it so as to prevent such uses by the public;
that the water of the river is the property of the State
and that the State has the duty to equally guard all
interests in the use of the water as provided by Art. 1,
§ 31, and Art. 8, § 1, Constitution of Wyoming; that
by virtue of the State's ownership of the water,
plaintiff and others similarly situated have the right to
use the water and the bed of the river for the public
purposes enumerated; that defendants denied plaintiff
and all other persons the right to use the bed or
channel of the river; that defendants fenced the same
and claimed they could expel and remove by force, if
necessary, the plaintiff and others who attempted to
use the bed and channel of the river without first
obtaining defendants' consent; that defendants did not
permit plaintiff to exercise his claimed *141 rights
and will not permit plaintiffs exercise of the same
unless restrained; that the question presented is one
of great public interest and as such should be
determined as provided by Ch. 3, Art. 58,
W.C.S.1945 (now § § 1-1049 to 1-1064, W.S.1957,
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act); and that the
Attorney General should intervene.
The defendants' answer in substance denies the river
is navigable in fact, although defendants admit that
certain small craft have floated and do float upon it,
and denies the plaintiff has any of the rights or
privileges alleged in the complaint.
Defendants allege that the use of small boats during
part of the year upon the river does not constitute
navigation of the river, nor does the floating of logs,
ties and timber establish the river as being navigable;
that they have the right to fence the river channel
upon their own land and have the right to use the
channel in their own business; that they have the right
to deny plaintiff and others all uses, privileges and
rights claimed by the plaintiff; and that they will not
permit fishing, camping, boating, or other similar use
of the river channel within their lands, nor will they
permit the use of the surface of the river's water as it
passes through and across their land except with their
permission.
Defendants further allege they hold the fee title to
their respective lands and that neither of them can
profitably operate his ranch if plaintiff prevails; that
other landowners upon rivers, lakes and reservoirs
will be vitally affected by the outcome of the action;

and that they have always assumed and believed their
properties were free from trespass by others.
The plaintiff and defendants stipulated that the
complaint accurately and completely states the
material facts; that the conclusions of law therein are
not admitted; and that those conclusions of law
constitute the issues in the case.
The intervenors' answer alleges that from time
immemorial the waters of the North Platte River have
been used continuously for transportation by shallow
draft craft and of logs, etc.; that in 1869 the river was
declared by law to be a public highway (repealed
however by Ch. 42, Laws of Wyoming, 1901); that
the water is now State property; that during the
winter the river is dangerous to livestock because of
freezing and thaw, and in the spring the river is
dangerous to livestock because of floating trees, logs,
etc.; that many ranchers fence along the river
margins; that from early summer to about September
1, the water volume permits boating, but after
September 1, the water diminishes, boating is not
feasible, and cattle may venture into the river with
safety; that some ranchers fence across the river to
prevent cattle straying, but some fences are destroyed
in the winter by ice and are washed out in the spring
by high water; that one defendant in 1957 erected a
barrier across the river not connected with any fence
controlling livestock, and declared he intended to
prevent use of the river by boats and fishermen; that
this barrier was destroyed and washed out; that this
action was brought by plaintiff with the advice,
consent, counsel and collaboration of defendants; that
intervenors contend only that they and the public are
entitled to continue to float on waters of the river
without hindrance and to catch fish owned by the
State, having due regard and respect for the rights of
adjacent landowners. The intervenors then describe
their personal and business activities and the interests
they represent, claiming that the action between
plaintiff and defendants presents fictitious issues and
misrepresents real issues between fishermen and
ranchers on the river; allege the title of defendants to
the lands involved is subject to reservations and
restrictions of record, and as provided by the laws of
the State and of the United States; that both the
waters of the river and the fish in those waters belong
to the State; that the public has the right to the use of
the waters for boat fishing; and that it is the duty of
the State to equally guard all the various interests of
the public in those waters.
Attached to the
intervenors' motion for summary judgment *142
were a number of affidavits which we deem to have
no material significance, with the exception of that of
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the State Engineer certifying that the average flow of
water for the month of July for the preceding ten
years at Saratoga, Wyoming, gauging station on the
North Platte River was 1,308 cubic feet per second,
and other affidavits stating that the river flow at the
point certified by the State Engineer was substantially
the same flow as that of the river where it crossed the
defendants' lands.
It is our understanding that a fair summary of the
respective position of the parties is as follows: The
plaintiff insists the river is navigable because it will
float craft, and, therefore, the bed of the river is
public property and can be used by the public
between its high water marks for any purpose of
which it is susceptible. The Attorney General denies
the river is navigable, but asserts it may be used for
floating of certain craft and for fishing and other
lawful purposes. Defendants contend no one except
themselves has any rights in the river as it passes
through their properties. The intervenors claim for
themselves and the public only the right to float upon
and fish within the river. The wool growers and
stock growers maintain no one has a right on streams
which pass through properties in private ownership
except the proprietors of the land.
There are certain sections of the State and Federal
Constitutions which counsel deem have bearing upon
the various questions involved here, as well as a host
of Wyoming statutory provisions. Those having
important significance are § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution relating to
due process and equal protection of law, and the
following sections of the Constitution of Wyoming:
Art. 1, § 6, relating to due process of law; Art. 1, §
7, denying there is absolute arbitrary power over
property; Art. 1, § 10, right of accused to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation; Art. 1, § 31,
giving the State the control of waters and requiring it
to equally guard all various interests involved; Art. 1,
§ 34, requiring all laws of a general nature to have
uniform operation; Art. 3, § 27, prohibiting certain
special laws; Art. 8, § 1, declaring the State's
ownership of all waters within its boundaries; and
Art. 13, § 1, relating to municipal corporation
classification. Applicable statutes will be referred to
as may be necessary.
The criticized judgment being declaratory of the law
under a particular set of circumstances, the court was
entitled to and undoubtedly did consider every factual
matter which was submitted. This included not only
matter contained in the pleadings, but also that
exhibited by affidavits and stipulation, even though

not expressly admitted or joined in by all parties.
This is because such additional facts were not
challenged or contradicted, and, hence, no genuine
issue of fact was presented which required resolution.
[1] The 'Brief Amicus Curiae of Wyoming Wool
Growers Association and Wyoming Stock Growers
Association' advises the court that the members of
those organizations have always contended the owner
of lands through which flows a stream nonnavigable
in the Federal sense may deny fishermen, hunters,
wanderers, and campers the right to use his property,
and although the Constitution declares all water is the
property of the State, that provision is limited to right
of appropriation for irrigation and other beneficial
uses; that while the Legislature has provided for
appropriation for water for those purposes, it has not
declared streams stocked with fish to be 'public ways'
nor regulated that type of use and such legislation is a
condition precedent to the claimed use of waters.
Aside from the fact that at the time this argument was
advanced, Ch. 205, S.L. of Wyoming, 1959, § § 41527,41-528, W.S.1957, was enacted and purported to
declare the State's waters might be used for floating
transportation, as early as 1909, the Legislature
enacted Ch. 68, § 2, S.L. of Wyoming, 1909
(substantially the same as § 41-3, W.S. 1957), which
gives recognition that transportation is a use to which
waters may be put in the language following:
*143 'Water rights are hereby defined as follows
according to use: Preferred uses shall include rights
for domestic and transportation purposes * * *.'
(Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, Ch. 89, Laws of Wyoming, 1901, and
Ch. 16, S.L. of Wyoming, 1903, now § 41-224,
W.S. 1957, regulated the driving or floating of logs,
timber or lumber down or upon any stream in the
State, without reference to its being navigable or
nonnavigable. These statutes indicate the Legislature
was aware that, without regard to their being
navigable or nonnavigable in the Federal sense or any
other concept of navigability, its waters were usable
for purposes other than irrigation, consumption,
power or mining, and the waters might be used for
transportation by flotation. So it would seem that
subject to whatever statutory limitations may be
imposed by the State on such use, or by the Federal
government when interstate or international rights are
involved, the actual usability of the waters is alone
the limit of the public's right to so employ them.
[2] Nothing is found in either our State Constitution,
the Act of Congress admitting the State to the Union,
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or any subsequent act of Congress, which limits the
kind or type of use the State may make of its waters.
[3] We understand that 'navigability in the Federal
sense' means the capability or susceptibility of
waters, in their natural condition, of being used for
navigation in interstate or international commerce,
and navigability in any other sense may mean any
one of a variety of definitions given navigability by
either of the several states of the Union.
[4] There is an element of paramount control by the
Federal government with respect to navigable waters,
but that superior right exists only where navigable
waters may be used in either interstate or
international commerce. This was made clear in City
of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma. 357 U.S. 320.
334. 78 S.Ct. 1209. 1217. 2 L.Ed.2d 1345. 1353. the
court saying:
'It is no longer open to question that the Federal
Government under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3) has dominion, to the
exclusion of the States, over navigable waters of the
United States. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)

See also 65 CJ.S. Navigable Waters § 10a, pp. 61,
62, and cases cited.
[5] However, except when so used or available for
use in interstate or international commerce, the
exclusive control of waters is vested in the state,
whether the waters are deemed navigable in the
Federal sense or in any other sense. See 65 CJ.S.
Navigable Waters § 10b, pp. 63-65. It follows the
state may lay down and follow such criteria for
cataloging waters as navigable or nonnavigable, as it
sees fit, and the state may also decide the ownership
of submerged lands, irrespective of the navigable or
nonnavigable character of waters above them. See
Donnelly v. United States. 228 U.S. 243. 33 S.Ct.
449. 57 L.Ed. 820. Ann.Cas.l913E. 710. rehearing
denied 228 U.S. 708. 33 S.Ct. 1024. 57 L.Ed. 1035.
All of counsel have dealt extensively with the
question of navigability or nonnavigability of the
river and rights incident thereto as it passes through
or across defendants' lands. We have carefully
examined the great volume of authorities referred to
or cited by counsel and have found them to be very
instructive. However, in the view we take, it would
serve no purpose to make exhaustive reference to or
give extensive quotations from them, as this would
only serve to exhibit the differences between Federal
views on what constitutes navigability and the

varieties of views on the subject entertained by the
courts of different states. Furthermore, any attempt to
improve upon or further elaborate the question would
probably not be fruitful.
Although we are not prepared to say the criteria used
by courts of different states and of the United States
to determine navigability of waters and ownership of
and beneath them were either unwise or unsound*144
when used to meet the special circumstances
presented in their respective jurisdictions, if we are to
observe the existing constitutional and statutory law
of this State, the great majority of those decisions are
of limited helpfulness. The mere capability of a
stream to float a single commercial crosstie, which
has been used at times as a somewhat extreme test
determining navigability and consequent ownership
of land underlying the water, does not solve the
question of whether waters in this State, which are
capable of being occasionally used to float acceptable
craft, may be so used even if they are considered as
being nonnavigable and are upon, pass or flow over
and across lands claimed in private ownership.
The basic reason for using navigability as a
classification was to designate certain waters as
public and others as private, and to give to public
authority, not only ownership and control of
navigable waters, but also ownership and control of
their beds and channels while leaving in private
ownership and control the beds and channels of
nonnavigable waters. In the instant case, however,
this test is rendered unnecessary to establish the
ownership of the waters, because by our Constitution
and its Congressional approval, the title of all waters
of the State is placed in public ownership. This
makes apropos the statement in Ne-Bo-Shone Ass!n
v. Hogarth. D.C. Mich.. 7 F.SUPD. 885. 889. affirmed
6Cir..81F.2d70:
'Because some waters are public, certain rights attach
thereto. These rights are not limited by the test by
which the nature of the waters is determined but to
the rights incident to the characterization as public of
the stream or body of water.'

[6] [7] Public ownership of the bed and channel of
navigable streams, as well as control of their waters,
seems to have been considered necessary in order to
forestall interference with the commercial navigation
of which they were capable. However, riparian
ownership to the center of nonnavigable streams need
not necessarily materially interfere with and does not
necessarily prevent the State's use of waters for
purposes for which they are adaptable and to which
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they may be put for the equal benefit of all members
of the public. Irrespective of the ownership of the
bed of a stream or of land upon which there are
waters or over which waters flow, the State's right to
control and use its own waters as it sees fit is
paramount, except as it may be shown the title of the
Federal government to such waters was incumbered
when that title passed from the Federal government
to the State upon its admission to the Union. Thus
the right of every person over or through whose lands
the waters belonging to the State are found or flow,
and whose title to waters does not antecede that of
the State, is subject to the State's right to use and
control its waters as it sees fit. The test of
navigability does not determine other uses to which
the State may put its waters even though navigability
would determine the title to the land underlying them.
In a late Ohio case (1959), Mentor Harbor Yachting
Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 170 Ohio St. 193. 163
N.E.2d 373. 375. it was said:
'The division of watercourses into navigable and
nonnavigable is merely a method of dividing them
into public and private, which is the more natural
classification. * * *'

But such a division or classification of watercourses,
while determining title to lands beneath navigable
waters, does not necessarily limit, destroy or curtail
the public's right to use nonnavigable waters nor
prevent the public's floating in or upon those waters
and fishing for fish planted and propagated therein by
the State, so long as such uses do not unnecessarily
trespass upon lands or properties which are in private
ownership and so long as the State does not curtail
such uses. Navigability is not the only touchstone by
which waters become public. The public may receive
title to them by grant and in the manner Wyoming
became possessed of all waters within the State.
*145 Article 8, § 1, of our Wyoming Constitution
declares the waters of all natural streams, springs,
lakes, or other collections of still water, within the
boundaries of the State, are the property of the State.
By its Act of Admission, approved July 10, 1890, 26
Stat. 222, ratifying our State Constitution, Congress
gave express approval to that declaration regarding
the State's ownership of waters. Merrill v. Bishop. 69
Wvo. 45. 237 P.2d 186: Id.. 74 Wvo. 298. 310. 311.
287 P.2d 620. 624: Mitchell Irr. Dist. v. Sharp. 10
Cir.. 121 F.2d964. 967. This court has interpreted the
State's title to the waters to be one of trust for the
benefit of the people. Farm Investment Co. v.
Carpenter. 9 Wvo. 110. 61 P. 258. 50 L.R.A. 747. 87

Am.St.Rep. 918: Willev v. Decker. 11 Wvo. 496. 73
P. 210. 100 Am.St.Rep. 939: Merrill v. Bishop,
supra; Lake De Smet Reservoir Co. v. Kanfmann, 75
Wvo. 87. 292 P.2d 482. See also Ne-Bo-Shone Ass'n
v. Hogarth. D.C.Mich.. 7 F.Supp. 885. affirmed 6
Cir..81F.2d70.
All parties seem to recognize that if a river is
nonnavigable the bed and channel of the stream
belong to the riparian owner. No one seriously
disputes that the waters themselves belong to the
State and are held in trust by it for the benefit of the
public. So if the river is nonnavigable we would
have a clear case of divided ownership of the river as
an entity, because title to the bed and channel would
be in the riparian owner and title to the waters is in
the State. Whether this be considered as a conflict of
interest or an overlapping of ownerships is of no
particular importance. At all events, it would be
desirable that each owner be accorded maximum
incidents of ownership with minimum obligation
upon the other.
The navigable or nonnavigable classification of
waters does not affect the State's ownership of its
waters nor lessen any use to which they may be put
by the public, so long, in the case of waters navigable
in interstate or international commerce, as that use
leaves their flow or presence unimpaired and so long,
in the case of nonnavigable waters, as such use is not
prohibited by the State. There seems to be no
considerable difference between dividing the
ownership and use of lands beneath waters from the
ownership and use of waters upon or flowing over or
across that land than there is in the horizontal
division in land ownership such as not infrequently
occurs in ownership of surface and subsurface areas.
Even where land is divided vertically there are
certain obligations or duties placed upon each owner
in order to enable the other to make use of and enjoy
that which is his. So it is that while the right of
ingress and egress upon and over the surface
accompanies subsurface ownership where there is a
horizontal division, there also is a similar right of
ingress and egress across adjacent lands where no
other access is available, as well as a restrainable
right of nuisance use of adjacent lands. Also, it may
be that a full use of lands underlying waters may
entitle their owner to some type of reasonable
easement in the State's waters. In each instance the
enjoyment of rights incident to separate ownership
may require easement in the property of another.
|"81[9][10] The title to waters within this State being
in the State, in concomitance, it follows that there
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must be an easement in behalf of the State for a right
of way through their natural channels for such waters
upon and over lands submerged by them or across the
bed and channels of streams or other collections of
waters. Callahan v. Price, 26 Idaho 745. 146 P. 732:
Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561. 95 P. 499. 24
L.R.A.,N.S.. 1240; Nelson v. Robinson. 47
Cal.App.2d 520. 118 P.2d 350: Id.. 73 Cal.App.2d
263. 166 P.2d 76: Scott v. Lattig. 227 U.S. 229. 33
S.Ct. 242. 57 L.Ed. 490. 44 L.R.A..N.S.. 107; Smith
v. Long. 76 Idaho 265. 281 P.2d 483: 65 C.J.S.
Navigable Waters § 93b(l), pp. 205, 206. The
waters not being in trespass upon or over the lands
where they naturally appear, they are available for
such uses by the public of which they are capable.
When waters are able to float craft, they may be so
used. When so floating craft, as a necessary incident
to that use, the bed *146 or channel of the waters
may be unavoidably scraped or touched by the
grounding of craft. Even a right to disembark and
pull, push or carry over shoals, riffles and rapids
accompanies this right of flotation as a necessary
incident to the full enjoyment of the public's
easement.
As early as 1874, Michigan courts
recognized that where a river was capable of floating
logs, that right of flotage was but a right of passage,
including only such rights as are incident to that right
and necessary to render it reasonably available. See
Grand Rapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis. 30 Mich. 308.
319. In 1909. Missouri, in McKinnev v. Northcutt.
114 Mo.App. 146. 89 S.W. 351. 355. did likewise
and later in Elder v. Delcour. 241 Mo.App. 839. 263
S.W.2d221. reversed 364 Mo. 835. 269 S.W.2d 17.
47 A.L.R.2d 370. reaffirmed that principle. On the
other hand, where the use of the bed or channel is
more than incidental to the right of floating use of the
waters, and the primary use is of the bed or channel
rather than the floating use of the waters, such
wading or walking is a trespass upon lands belonging
to a riparian owner and is unlawful. Such trespass
cannot be made lawful either by legislative or judicial
action. Thus the use of waters for the floating of
which they are capable and uses incidental thereto, as
distinguished from unlicensed use of the land beneath
them, is within the public's right unless made
unlawful by statute. Except as herein specified, to
use the bed or channel of the river to wade or walk
the stream remains an unlawful trespass. This
disagrees somewhat with Munninghoff v. Wisconsin
Conservation Commission. 255 Wis. 252, 38 N.W.2d
712: Elder v. Delcour, supra; and perhaps with some
other authorities.
Notwithstanding that the Elder-Delcour case was
decided with reference to what was said to be its own

peculiar facts, those facts are so closely paralleled in
the matter before us as to make them quite helpful
here. There the river in question was held to be
nonnavigable, notwithstanding it could be floated by
canoes, rowboats and other small craft, and in the
past had been used for floating and transporting logs
and timber. The stream was well stocked with fish
and was heavily fished by sportsmen, both by wading
and floating and from the banks. Also access to the
river could be gained from a public road and at points
where it crossed privately owned lands. It was
claimed the public had the right not only to float by
craft upon the waters of the river and to leave the
river and carry or drag around obstructions, but also
the right to wade the river and use its banks for
camping and recreation.
Under our conception of the law, if we hold the river
in question here is nonnavigable, then title to the bed
or channel of the stream will be in the riparian owner.
By Constitutional edict, title to all waters is in the
State. Under such circumstances the use of waters
for floating, with incidental use of their beds and
channels, cannot be interfered with or obstructed by
the riparian owner. However, in using the State's
waters for floating, the public is not privileged,
except as incidental to such use, to violate other
property rights of riparian owners. Where such
divided ownership occurs, 'the landowner and the
public have certain reciprocal rights, which may be
enjoyed without the destruction of the other.'
Charnley v. Shawano Water Power & River
Improvement Co.. 109 Wis. 563. 569. 85 N.W. 507.
509. 53 L.R.A. 895. We are not inclined to go as far
as the Missouri court when it permitted wading or
walking upon the bed or channel of the river or use of
its banks for recreation. Perhaps the reason for our
difference with the Missouri court is seated in the fact
that our conclusions are based solely upon
Wyoming's Constitutional declaration that all waters
within its boundaries belong to the State, while the
court in Missouri, which state does not have such an
express constitutional declaration as ours, may have
been largely influenced by other considerations.
[11][12] Streams in their natural state, such as that
described by the factual matter appearing in the
record before us, although capable of intermittent
floating of craft for recreational use and for small
*147 commercial use in the floating of ties, logs, and
timber, are nevertheless unsuited for navigation in
interstate or international commerce and are not of
such economic value for transportation as justifies
their being classified as navigable waters, thereby
taking from riparian proprietors the title and
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ownership of the bed and channel of the river where
it flows by, through, over, across, or upon their lands.
So we must hold the portion of the river here in
question is nonnavigable and that its bed and channel
are the property of the riparian owner.
This
conclusion is fortified by the fact that the use to
which the waters of the river have been put in the
past to seasonably float logs and timber and certain
small craft by which various activities, such as
fishing, hunting, pleasure, etc., may be continued by
the public's using only the waters of the stream
themselves and without any but minor and incidental
use of the lands beneath them.

penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to
what the State commands or forbids. * * * 'a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application violates the first essential of due
process of law." Lanzetta v. [State of] New Jersey.
306 U.S. 451. 453. 59 S.Ct. 618. 83 L.Ed. 888: see
also Connallv v. General Const. Co.. 269 U.S. 385.
391. 46 S.Ct. 126. 70 L.Ed. 322. Such also is the law
of the State of California. People v. McCaughan. 49
Cal.2d 409.414. 317 P.2d 974.'

[13] Irrespective of the ownership of the bed or
channel of waters, and irrespective of their
navigability, the public has the right to use public
waters of this State for floating usable craft and that
use may not be interfered with or curtailed by any
landowner. It is also the right of the public while so
lawfully floating in the State's waters to lawfully hunt
or fish or do any and all other things which are not
otherwise made unlawful. See Ne-Bo-Shone Ass'n v.
Hogarth. D.C.Mich.. 7 F.Supp. 885, affirmed 6 Cir..
81F.2d70.

The court continued 350 P.2d at page 123:
'* * * The first aspect of the difficulty is that citizens
are not sufficiently warned by vague language as to
what course of conduct is denounced. Secondly, the
court is given insufficient standards by which to
judge the defendant's conduct. Consequently, each
judge and jury is free to define the crime in any
manner that it sees fit, giving rise to the dangers of
imposing ex post facto punishment on the defendant,
having the jury find the *148 law as well as the facts
and giving the statute the effect of a bill of attainder
in each particular case.

Although Ch. 205, S.L. of Wyoming, 1959, now § §
41-527,41-528, W.S.1957 (1959 Supp.), was enacted
after the commencement of this litigation, a mere
declaration of the law's application respecting the
relative rights of the public and riparian owners of the
river, before it became effective, would be valueless
if the Act in any way affected those relative rights.
We should, therefore, examine the new law, first, to
determine its constitutionality, and if found not to
transcend constitutional law, then to ascertain what, if
any, change it makes in the rights involved.
Plaintiff-appellee suggests the 'floating' is used as an
opposite to wading or walking. We, therefore,
assume he concluded the Act does not affect any
rights of those who wade or walk the river, because
the Act is silent respecting them.
With this
conclusion we can agree without conceding the right
to wade or walk exists.
In condemning the Act as void for ambiguity, lack of
uniformity and vagueness, this appellee cites In re
Newbern. 53 Cal.2d 786. 3 Cal.Rptr. 364. 350 P.2d
116.120.121.123. as follows:
The requirement of a reasonable degree of certainty
in legislation, especially in the criminal law, is a well
established element of the guarantee of due process
of law. 'No one may be required at peril of life,
liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of

'Finally, we might point out that the Constitution of
the State of California commands that all general
laws be of uniform operation. Const., Art. I, § 11.
That provision will not tolerate a criminal law so
lacking in definition that each defendant is left to the
vagaries of individual judges and juries. * * *'

Counsel also likens the Newbern holding to what this
court had to say in Eastwood v. Wyoming Highway
Department. 76 Wvo. 247. 301 P.2d 818. claiming
that although a portion of our Driver License Law
was held unconstitutional for improper delegation of
legislative power to an administrative office, this
court indicated that the ambiguity of the statute
would also render it unconstitutional.
[14] It seems to us Chapter 205 is fraught with
indefiniteness, leaving uncertain legislative intent and
impregnating the Act with ambiguities.
In substance the Act says persons and property may
only float by boat, canoe and raft down a stream
where for ten years preceding the stream had an
average flow for July exceeding 1,000 cubic feet per
second. It then makes it unlawful to obstruct or
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prevent such use except to protect present and future
authorized installations; provides that those invested
with property rights may fence, so long as the fencing
shall not interfere with the prescribed floating; makes
it unlawful for any person floating to go upon, or
shoot over or into, or damage or litter the property on
either side of the water; and provides a fine of $100
for violation of the Act.
One meaning which may be given to the word 'only'
would merely limit the means and methods by which
persons and property may be floated. Another
meaning would be that floating downstream was
permitted while floating upstream was not
sanctioned. A boat, canoe or raft is floating, whether
it goes upstream or downstream, even though the
upstream progress requires use of oars, motors,
poling, sails, pushing, or other means of propulsion.
If the Act be considered as prohibiting the floating of
persons or property in streams of the specified flow
in any other manner than by boat, canoe or raft, it
excludes the floating in such streams of any tie, log,
or other material unless made into some kind of raft,
yet in streams of less flow, it would leave untouched
their use for tie, log and timber drives.
Again the Act might be construed as prohibiting all
types of floating use in streams unless the stream
meets the flow specifications prescribed, and, if so, is
it intended to repeal by implication § 41-224,
W.S.I957, which provides for floating of certain
materials without regard to average flow?
In fact, the Act, as far as flotation goes, does not in
terms either permit or prohibit anything. If the
statute is said to grant a permissive right not
theretofore enjoyed by the public, the word 'only'
might fairly be construed as a word of limitation
upon the grant. If, however, it is taken to have the
connotation of prohibition, it would imply the
previous existence of a right which was being denied,
at least in part, by the statute. That which is made
unlawful is, of course, prohibited by law. The
proscriptive fencing and going upon, shooting over or
into property, and the damaging or littering of
property while floating are made unlawful, and
consequently, prohibited and properly made subject
to penalty. But in the balance of the Act, relating to
floating upon the river, nothing is expressly
commanded, prohibited or made unlawful. If the Act
merely limits floating to being exercised in a certain
way, floating in any other way violates the Act and
subjects to penalty, even though that is not made
unlawful. A person charged in the language of the

statute with violation of that part of the Act would be
at loss to know exactly with what crime he was being
charged. Would it be because he had *149 floated in
some manner other than by boat, canoe or raft; or that
he had floated up or otherwise than down the river; or
that he floated in the river when it failed of having
averaged the prescribed flow of water?
Whatever view is taken as to the meaning of the word
'only' in its context, the result must arise solely by
implication, construction or interpretation. There is
no plain, clear, unambiguous meaning expressed by it
which gives that certainty required in criminal
statutes. Nevertheless, the Act is definitely intended
as a criminal law for it makes unlawful the
obstruction of 'such' stream so as to prevent its use,
except so far as may be necessary to protect existing
installations and authorized future installations. It
also makes unlawful certain acts by persons when
floating any stream. The penalty prescribed by the
Act is to be inflicted upon all persons who 'violate'
the Act, whether such violation consists of doing that
which is made unlawful, or for the doing of a thing
which may be considered as being impliedly
prohibited, or for going beyond the permission which
may be thought to be impliedly granted.
If the word 'only' is taken as a limitation upon
floating, the Act is violated and subjects to penalty
when floating occurs in any other manner even
though that which is done is neither prohibited nor
made unlawful. But this statutory definition of the
limit of a right does not in itself make going beyond
that limit a crime and subject the offender to criminal
punishment. Floating in or upon the waters of a
river, the flow of which does not meet that which is
specified, is not expressly prohibited or made
unlawful, nor is floating up the river or merely
remaining afloat or floating by some other means
made unlawful or prohibited. So the Act may be
violated in those respects without committing a crime
or breaching the law. In Commonwealth v. Galloway.
203 Kv. 102, 261 S.W. 887. 888. where a statute
provided that a failure to comply with any of its
provisions was a misdemeanor, the court held:
'* * * In a penal statute the mere granting of the
privilege to do a thing in a particular way may not be
construed into a prohibition against doing that thing
in any other way, especially when the whole act
contemplates the doing of that thing in some way.'

When our Act says such violation is to be penalized,
it is clearly unconstitutional, as it assumes to punish
that which is not prohibited, unlawful or made
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criminal. This in itself not only makes that portion of
the Act unconstitutional, but as the statute is penal
and to be strictly construed, we must hold Ch. 205,
S.L. of Wyoming, 1959, unconstitutional in toto.
McFarland v. City of Cheyenne. 48 Wvo. 86. 42 P.2d
413: Annotation, 104A.L.R. 1095.
If we had any doubt about the unconstitutionality of
the 1959 law, it would seem to be resolved by
pronouncements in State v. A. H. Read Co., 33 Wvo.
387. 401. 402. 240 P. 208. 212. 213. There it was
argued that nothing was declared unlawful by the
statute, and nothing penalized, except a violation of
the provisions of statute which merely declared a
legislative limitation of the time of service upon
public works without expressly commanding or
prohibiting anything. After pointing out that the
Federal Supreme Court had held
'* * * that a penal statute, prescribing no certain
standard of conduct, violates the fundamental
principle of justice embodied in the conception of
due process of law, and is void because violating the
provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States declaring that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, and the provision of the
Sixth Amendment declaring that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; *

this court said:
'* * * And state laws thus uncertain are likewise held
to be void *150 upon the same principle, as violating
the due process of law clause and the other related
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
applies to state governments. * * *'

It then noted that because of the absence from the
statute of the necessary expressions of command or
prohibition, a Federal constitutional question was
presented and our own State constitution provided
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused had the
right to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation (Art. 1, § 10, Wyoming Constitution),
this would be denied him in the absence of sufficient
certainty in the statute under which he was being
prosecuted, and said at 240 P. 212-213:
4
* * * no one can be lawfully convicted of a * * *
misdemeanor, unless the act charged, if not a crime at
common law, is clearly denounced or penalized as a
crime by statute. So it is well settled that criminal
statutes are to be strictly construed, which means that

they are not to be enlarged by implication or
extended by inference or construction * * *.'

Of the rule thus stated, the court further said it
'* * * requires a sufficient degree of certainty in a
criminal statute, that will place it outside the
necessity of judicial determination, through mere
implication or construction, of who or what acts are
punishable under it. * * *'

And the court quoted with approval at 240 P. 213:
'Thus in U. S. v. Reese. 92 U.S. 214. 23 L.Ed. 563. it
is said:
"If the Legislature undertakes to define by statute a
new offense, and provide for its punishment, it
should express its will in language that need not
deceive the common mind. Every man should be
able to know with certainty when he is committing a
crime. * * * It would certainly be dangerous if the
Legislature could set a net large enough to catch all
possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and
who should be set at large. This would, to some
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative
department of the government."

The case now before us is thus placed squarely within
those pronouncements of State v. Read, supra,
because it would be only by judicial determination
through implication or construction that other than
certain types of floating would be prohibited and
made unlawful so as to subject an accused to the
penalty provided if such floating occurred.
The patents from which defendants1 titles are
deraigned do not exclude or reserve therefrom the
bed or channel of the river. The most that is claimed
to be contained in the patents involved is that they
were granted subject to any vested and accrued water
rights for mining, agricultural, manufacturing or
other purposes, and rights to ditches and reservoirs
used in connection with such water rights. 43
U.S.C.A. § 661. We do not understand these
reservations to withdraw from the patent the beds or
channels of rivers.
Furthermore numerous decisions support our view
that the title to the nonnavigable waters belong to the
riparian owners.
<* * * Title to the beds of the nonnavigable rivers and
streams within the state remains in the United States,
or in those persons who have received title from the
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United States. * * ** 93 CJ.S. Waters § 71, p. 748.

See also State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330:
United States v. State of Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 55 S.Ct.
610, 79 L.Ed 1267: United States v. State of Utah,
283 U.S. 64. 51 S.Ct. 438, 75 L.Ed. 844: United
States v. Champlin Refining Co., 10 Cir., 156 F.2d
769, affirmed 331 U.S. 788, 67 S.Ct. 1346, 91 L.Ed.
1818, rehearing denied 331 U.S. 869, 67 S.Ct. 1727,
91 L.Ed. 1872: *151Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. State
ex rel. Com'rs of Land Office, 200 Okl. 134, 191
P.2d 224: Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Or. 625, 56 P.2d
1158: Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State, 76 N.D. 464, 37
N.W.2d488.
The question presented here is not that of creating a
new public right nor even of giving initial recognition
to an unused public right. We are dealing with a use
long enjoyed by the public which is properly theirs,
but which is now sought to be denied them.
[15] The interveners' contention that there is no
justiciable issue and that this is not a class action is
without merit. The plaintiff not only claimed a right
and attempted to indulge it, but was prevented from
doing so by the acts of the defendants. Thereby a
real justiciable issue arose. It provided a real dispute,
not a moot one. Under the facts submitted we are
also convinced the litigation is properly considered as
a class action affecting the rights of the public
generally.
Intervenors1 further complaint that their motion for
summary judgment was improperly denied, while
possibly having some merit, is at least subject to
considerable doubt, especially as it was predicated
upon a statute which is held to be unconstitutional.
In any event, the substantial result sought by the
motion is accomplished by our holdings herein.
In conclusion, while we recognize the legislative
right to regulate within constitutional limits the
floating, as well as other uses of public waters, until
such time as regulations are promulgated we hold:
That the portion of the river in dispute is
nonnavigable; that its riparian owners have title to the
bed and channel of the river, but that this title is
subject to an easement for a right of way of the river's
waters in their natural channel through, over and
across defendants' lands; that the waters of the river
are the property of the State and are held by it in trust
for the equal use and benefit of the public; that the
waters of the river may be used by the public for
floating usable craft therein or thereon and for

transporting in such usable craft persons or property;
that as an incident to the full enjoyment and use of
the State's easement for its waters over and across the
lands held in private ownership, persons so floating
in usable craft may, when necessary, disembark and
walk, or wade upon submerged lands in order to pull,
push, or carry craft over or across shallows, riffles,
rapids or obstructions; that while so floating in usable
craft, the public may fish or hunt or do any and all
other things which are not otherwise made unlawful,
but that the State is without power to authorize the
violation of any property rights of riparian or other
owners except as incident to the full exercise of
easement to which property may be subject; that the
waters of the river, if capable thereof, may also be
used for transporting logs, ties, timber and other
material when permitted by State law; that riparian
owners of lands bordering upon or through which the
river flows may not in any manner obstruct the flow
of the river's waters so as to interfere with or prevent
the free passage of any craft used commercially or for
recreation or for floating ties, logs, or timber; that Ch.
205, S.L. of Wyoming, 1959, now § § 41-527, 41528, W.S.1957 (1959 Supp.), is unconstitutional as
being vague, uncertain, ambiguous and subjecting to
its penalty the violation of provisions of the Act
which are neither made unlawful nor prohibited; and
that the judgment appealed from must be reversed
insofar as it permits unrestricted walking or wading
in or upon the bed or channel of the river and that the
judgment of the lower court be vacated in this
respect.
The judgment is therefore reversed in part, and the
cause remanded with direction to vacate so much of
the judgment as is contrary to our holdings herein,
and to make such further judgment as may be
necessary to conform with this opinion.
Reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Wyo. 1961
Day v. Armstrong
362 P.2d 137
END OF DOCUMENT
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MONROE v. STATE Utah 1946
Supreme Court of Utah.
MONROE et al.
v.
STATE et al.
No. 6964.
Dec. 20, 1946.
Appeal from District Court, Fifth Judicial District,
Millard County; Will L. Hoyt, Judge.
Suit by Ralph Monroe and others against the State
and another to quiet title to the bed of a lake. Decree
for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
HI Navigable Waters 270 €=>36(1)
270 Navigable Waters
270II Lands Under Water
270k36 Ownership and Control in General
270k36(l) k. Ownership by State. Most
Cited Cases
Waters and Water Courses 405
405 Waters and Water Courses
405IV Natural Lakes and Ponds
405kl 11 k. Rights to Bed and Banks. Most
Cited Cases
Owners of property on shores of lake should fail in
their suit to quiet title to bed of lake as against state,
if lake was navigable when state was admitted to
union, but should prevail if lake was non-navigable at
that time. Utah Code 1943, 86-1-14.
121 Navigable Waters 270 € = > i ( 7 )
270 Navigable Waters
2701 Rights of Public
270kl Navigability in General
270kl(7) k. Evidence as to Navigability.
Most Cited Cases
Evidence that lake was comparatively small and so
located that it was easier to go around than to cross it
and that it would probably develop in future as
irrigation reservoir, as it had in past, supported
district court's finding of improbability that lake
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would ever be valuable as highway for commerce, as
required to render it navigable and preclude owners
of property on shores thereof from quieting title to
lake bed as against state. Utah Code 1943, 86-1-14.
]31 Navigable Waters 270 €=^l(3)
270 Navigable Waters
2701 Rights of Public
270kl Navigability in General
270kl(3) k. Test of Navigability in General.
Most Cited Cases
To be "navigable," a water course should be
susceptible of use for purposes of commerce or
possess capacity for valuable floatage in
transportation to market of products of country
through which it runs and should be of practical
usefulness to public as public highway in its natural
state, without aid of artificial means, and theoretical
or potential navigability or temporary, precarious and
unprofitable one is insufficient.
141 Navigable Waters 270 € = > l ( 3 )
270 Navigable Waters
2701 Rights of Public
270kl Navigability in General
270kl(3) k. Test of Navigability in General.
Most Cited Cases
While navigable quality of water course need not be
continuous, it should continue long enough to be
useful and valuable in transportation, and fluctuations
should come regularly with the seasons, so that
period of navigability may be depended upon, to
render it a navigable water course.
151 Navigable Waters 270 € = ^ l ( 3 )
270 Navigable Waters
2701 Rights of Public
270kl Navigability in General
270kK3) k. Test of Navigability in General.
Most Cited Cases
Mere depth of water, without profitable utility, or its
sufficiency for pleasure boating or to enable hunters
and fishermen to float their boats will not render
water course navigable in legal sense, so as to subject
it to public servitude, but to be navigable it must have
useful capacity as public highway of transportation.
J61 Navigable Waters 270 € ^ > i ( 3 )
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270 Navigable Waters
2701 Rights of Public
270kl Navigability in General
270kl(3) k. Test of Navigability in General.
Most Cited Cases
"Navigable water" is that which, by its depth, width
and location, is rendered available for commerce,
whether actually so used or not.
121 Navigable Waters 270 €>^>l(3)
270 Navigable Waters
2701 Rights of Public
270kl Navigability in General
270kl(3) k. Test of Navigability in General.
Most Cited Cases
"Navigability" is not dependent merely on physical
capabilities of particular body of water to support
transportation of goods, but public interest therein
arises only when it is so situated that it becomes or is
likely to become a valuable factor in commerce.
181 Navigable Waters 270 €=>i(7)
270 Navigable Waters
2701 Rights of Public
270kl Navigability in General
270kl(7) k. Evidence as to Navigability.
Most Cited Cases
In suit by owners of property on shores of lake to
quiet title to bed thereof as against state and its
grazing lessee, evidence showed that lake was not
navigable when state was admitted to union, so as to
require decree for plaintiffs. Utah Code 1943, 86-114.

FN1. Povnter v. Chipman. 8 Utah 442, 32
P. 690: Knudsen v. Omanson. 10 Utah 124,
37 P. 250: State v. Rolio. 71 Utah 91. 262 P.
987: Robinson v. Thomas. 75 Utah 446. 286
P. 625.
**760 *3 Elias Hansen, of Salt Lake City, for
appellants.
Grover A. Giles, Atty. Gen., C. N. Ottosen, Asst.
Atty. Gen., and Milton A. Melville, of Fillmore, for
respondents.
PRATT, Justice.
What is a navigable lake? This issue arises in a suit
in which plaintiffs and defendants each seek to quiet
title to the bed of Scipio Lake, in Millard County, this
State. Plaintiffs own property on the shores of the

lake and the defendant State of Utah has leased part
of the bed of the lake to defendant George E. Brown,
for grazing purposes. The grazing brought plaintiffs
and Brown in conflict.
[1] If the lake was navigable when this state was
admitted to the Union plaintiffs should fail. Sec. 861-14, U.C.A. 1943; Povnter v. Chipman. 8 Utah 442.
32 P. 690: Knudsen v. Omanson. 10 Utah 124, 37 P.
250: State v. Rolio. 71 Utah 91. 262 P. 987:
Robinson v. Thomas et al.. 75 Utah 446. 286 P. 625:
and annotation 23 A.L.R. 757.
It the lake was non-navigable at that time plaintiffs
should prevail. In addition to the above authorities:
Annotation 112 A.L.R. 1114: State v. Aucoin. 206
La. 787. 20 So.2d 136. at page 158: United States v.
Appalachian Power Co.. 311 U.S. 377. 61 S.Ct. 291.
85 L.Ed. 243: United States v. State of Oregon. 295
U.S. 1. 55 S.Ct. 610. 79 L.Ed. 1267: United States v.
State of Utah. 283 U.S. 64. 51 S.Ct. 438. 75 L.Ed.
844: United States v. Holt Bank. 270 U.S. 49. 46
S.Ct. 197. 70 L.Ed. 465: State of Oklahoma v. State
of Texas. 258 U.S. 574. 42 S.Ct. 406. 66 L.Ed. 771:
and Gratz v. McKee. 8 Cir.. 270 F. 713 23 A.L.R.
1393. (The dissenting opinion in the Louisiana case
and the annotations of 23 A.L.R. and 112 A.L.R.
cover the authorities upon this question rather
thoroughly. The Louisiana case was decided in 1944.
Sec. 86-1-14, U.C.A.1943, by its terms excludes the
beds of non-navigable lakes from the legislative
declaration of ownership.)
*4 The lower court found in favor of defendants and
plaintiffs have appealed.
Conveyances to plaintiffs and their predecessors in
interest are by lot and section number so no claim can
arise that plaintiffs* property rights are specifically
limited by description to the meander line of the lake.
Among the facts found by the lower court are these:
At the time Utah was settled, Scipio Lake was a
natural lake; a 2 foot dam was, about that time
(1867), built at the lower end of the lake; that the lake
had an extreme length of about 1 1/2 miles, and a
maximum width of about 5/8 of a mile; that it had an
average depth of 4 to 5 feet and covered an area when
filled to capacity of the natural basin of
approximately 580 acres (plaintiffs contend 277
acres); that the Federal Government surveyed the
lake in 1871, fixing its meander line, fixing the length
of the lake at 1 3/4 miles and width of 3/4 mile; that it
has maintained that size until the present time, except
for dry years when irrigation lowered it considerably;
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that the meander line fixed the approximate size of
the lake when this State was admitted to statehood
(Jan. 4, 1896); that it has not been used for
transportation of 'goods of commerce'; that it has no
connection with navigable streams or other navigable
bodies of water; that it has been used for boating,
fishing, and swimming; and that its surroundings are
such it appears improbable the lake will ever be
valuable as a highway for commerce. The court then
makes this statement as a part of his findings of fact:
'* * * that in view of the trend of decisions in recent
years to view similar shallow bodies of water as
**761 navigable, the Court finds that Scipio Lake at
the time Utah was admitted to the Union was a
navigable body of water * * *.'
This is a conclusion of law supported by the court's
explanation of why he believed it necessary. The
conclusion of navigability is repeated as paragraph
one of his conclusions of law. We are of the opinion
that navigability should not be determined without
regard to practical considerations.*5 The fact that
the lower court included the explanation impresses
one with the thought that he thought the lake was not,
as a matter of fact, navigable, but, due to the
idiosyncrasies of the law, it must be so held.
[21 Scipio Lake is comparatively small and so
located that, as stated by one witness, it is easier to go
around it than to cross it. The public left to itself, is
not going to select the hard way of travel, and if it is
a short cut to go around it, that short cut will be used.
These facts considered in the light of the probability
of the future of that lake developing as it has in the
past, as a reservoir for irrigation, are ample support
for the court's finding that it is improbable the lake
will ever be valuable as a highway for commerce.
Such a finding is inconsistent with the idea that The
natural navigation of the river is such that it affords a
channel for useful commerce.'
(Italics ours.)
(Quoting Mr. Justice Hughes in United States v. State
of Utah, supra f283 U.S. 64. 51 S.Ct. 445]). The
author of the cited opinion also uses the expression
'To meet the needs of commerce.' (Italics ours.)
The factual differences between that case and this
must not be lost to our sight. There the court was
dealing with miles of river crossing state lines which
might easily be broken up into navigable and nonnavigable areas. There was value in the use of such
long stretches of water-they were useful-the public
had need for them. But Scipio Lake is so small it
must be treated as a unit. It, as a unit, is either
valuable for transportation or it is not valuable.
There is no evidence justifying any conclusion that it
is likely ever to develop as a valuable means of
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public commercial transportation. Obviously its
navigability should not be governed by our powers of
imagination to vision what we deem sufficient to
make it such a public waterway.
f31[41[51 In Harrison v. Fite. 8 Cir.. 148 F. 781. 783.
cited in the Louisiana case (dissenting opinion) of our
list above, there is some discussion of the element of
*6 usefulness. We quote therefrom: T o meet the
test of navigability as understood in the American
law a water course should be susceptible of use for
purposes of commerce or possess a capacity for
valuable floatage in the transportation to market of
the products of the country through which it runs. It
should be of practical usefulness to the public as a
public highway in its natural state and without the aid
of artificial means. A theoretical or potential
navigability, or one that is temporary, precarious, and
unprofitable, is not sufficient. While the navigable
quality of a water course need not be continuous, yet
it should continue long enough to be useful and
valuable in transportation; and the fluctuations should
come regularly with the seasons, so that the period of
navigability may be depended upon. Mere depth of
water, without profitable utility, will not render a
water course navigable in the legal sense, so as to
subject it to public servitude, nor will the fact that it
is sufficient for pleasure boating or to enable hunters
or fishermen to float their skiffs or canoes. To be
navigable a water course must have a useful capacity
as a public highway of transportation. * * *.'
£61 In the Louisiana case [206 La. 787. 20 So.2d
154]. the prevailing opinion states the law to be (as to
navigable water): cIt is that which, by its depth,
width, and location is rendered available for
commerce whether it be actually so used or not.'
(Italics ours.) We believe that location is an
important factor in this western mountainous and
desert country. The writer has in mind a lake above
timber line and near the top of a 10,000 foot
mountain peak which from the standpoint of depth
and width would have floatage potentialities
sufficient for the transportation of goods-but to
where? That's the question. Furthermore it is almost
a hands **762 and knees climb to get to that lake. To
hold it to be a navigable body of water would be an
oddity to say the least. Sailing that lake, one would
get nowhere fast.
In the case of Gratz v. McKee, supra, speaking of a
stream, the court quoted the following language from
a Washington case as the weight of authority: *7 'It
must be so situated, and have such length and
capacity, as will enable it to accommodate the public

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Page 4

i1 J r.za /D?

111 Utah 1, 175P.2d759
(Cite as: 111 Utah 1,175 P.2d 759)
generally as a means of transportation.' Page 716 of
270 R. Page 1396 of 23 A.L.R.
In United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, the term
'useful commerce' is used and these words were
adopted in the case of United States v. State of Utah.
[7] It seems fair to say from all of these decisions
that navigability is not dependent merely upon the
physical capabilities of the particular body of water
to support transportation of goods. The public interest
in such a body of water arises only when it is so
situated that it becomes or is likely to become a
valuable factor in commerce.

opinion. Costs to appellants.
LARSON, C. J., and McDONOUGH, and WADE,
JJ., concur.
WOLFE, J., concurs in the result.
Utah 1946
Monroe v. State
111 Utah 1,175P.2d759
END OF DOCUMENT

[8] In addition to the facts found by the lower court,
there is evidence in the record that the only clear part
of the lake in the early days was its center, that
bullrushes and cattails covered part of it; and that part
was sod used for haying, which was so soft in places
that an ox sunk through it. There is also evidence of
a growth upon its bed that cattle would wade out to
eat. In some of the survey reports the term 'swamp'
is used as to part of it. In the winter it froze over.
Since statehood and since the dam has been increased
considerably in height, there have been years when
the lake went dry, presumably from irrigation use and
dry weather. All these facts point away from the idea
of navigability. If we hold the principle set out in the
case of United States v. Appalachian Power Co.,
supra [311 U.S. 377. 61 S.Ct. 299], as applicable here
there is still the factor of value or usefulness
involved. The principle of that case, to which
reference is made, is this: CA waterway, otherwise
suitable for navigation, is not barred from that
classification merely because artificial aids must
make the highway suitable for use before commercial
navigation may be undertaken.' But the court also
says: 'There must be a balance between cost and
need at a time when the improvement would be
useful,'' (Italics ours.) *8 This is also said: 'The
tests as to navigability must take these variations into
consideration.' The words 'these variations' refer to a
comparison made between the heavy traffic of the
harbors of our seacoast and the traffic of the sparsely
settled regions of the western mountains.
For the reasons given we are of the opinion that
Scipio Lake was not navigable at the time this State
was admitted to the Union. We believe the evidence
justifies a finding of the facts as we have set them out
in this opinion, and that the conclusions and decree
should be in favor of plaintiffs. The decree of the
lower court is reversed and the cause remanded for
findings, conclusions and decree to conform to this
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